United Nations S/2016/1003

Security Council

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14 December 2016

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Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of China on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 13 December 2016 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations stating that Mr. Zhang Dianbin and Mr. Liu Song have been appointed alternate representatives of China on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

16-22166 (E) 161216

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United Nations S/2016/1004

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 November 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 29 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 29 November 2016 from Anas Abdah, President of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**
Permanent Representative

16-21110 (E) 021216

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Annex to the letter dated 29 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

It is with great urgency that I write to you on behalf of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces and the Syrian people to highlight the desperate humanitarian situation in Aleppo as the regime and its allies continue their relentless and indiscriminate bombardment of the city and countryside of Aleppo.

The liberated area of the city of Aleppo, home to more than 300,000 civilians, has been under de facto siege since August 2016 and under a devastating assault since 15 November 2016 by the Assad regime and its allies, systematically targeting civilians and vital civilian infrastructure, particularly medical facilities and schools. As I write to you, every hospital in Aleppo has gone out of service, leaving hundreds of people injured by the indiscriminate bombardment and at risk of losing their lives because of a complete lack of medical care. Actually, Assad regime and his allies are turning the liberated areas of the city of Aleppo into a virtual coffin, given that official food stocks are running out and civilians are under siege. Moreover, reports from the ground indicate that banned and indiscriminate weapons, including cluster bombs, barrel bombs and thermobaric bombs, have been used by the regime and its allies in their barbaric bombardments of residential areas in Aleppo.

This outrageous escalation of the situation in Aleppo has killed more than 670 people, 40 per cent of them children; caused the displacement of more than 3,000 families; destroyed 11 hospitals and medical centres; and involved the use of chlorine gas four times, which constitutes a further crime against humanity and a war crime in the regime's long and bloody record of barbarity. Moreover, it runs in the face of all relevant international resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013) and 2235 (2015), concerning the use of indiscriminate weapons in Syria, and Council resolutions 2254 (2015) and 2268 (2016), endorsing the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access agreement.

The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces believes that the Assad regime can only persist in this criminality as long as it enjoys the impunity it has enjoyed so far as a result of international inaction, let alone the active support of its allies, particularly Russia. As a pioneer of human rights and international peace and security in the world, the United Nations has the responsibility to translate words into action, to protect the civilians in Aleppo and to make sure that the regime's criminality against its own people no longer goes without consequences.

Therefore, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces hereby demands that the United Nations, as the main international sponsor of the political process in Syria, take immediate and decisive actions to ensure the protection of the civilians in Aleppo by: (a) stopping this barbaric attack on the civilians in Aleppo by compelling the Assad regime to abide by the terms of a cessation of hostilities; (b) allowing unfettered and immediate humanitarian access and medical aid to the city; (c) holding to account those responsible for these crimes; and (d) preventing the repetition of such gross violations. It is hardly an

exaggeration to say that the very credibility of the international system is at stake here. Failing to act to uphold the values and principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and all relevant resolutions would shake people's faith in the international system in Syria, the region and beyond.

We are counting on the United Nations to spare no effort to ensure that the suffering of the Syrian people is brought to an end and that their just demands of freedom, dignity and justice are finally fulfilled.

(*Signed*) Anas **Abdah**
President
National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces

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Security Council

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30 November 2016

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Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a document of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, presenting its position on the recommendations contained in the eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) (S/2016/629), which was submitted in accordance with paragraph (a) of annex I to resolution 2253 (2015).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the position paper could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gerard **van Bohemen**
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

16-21092 (E) 051216

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Recommendations contained in the eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

1. On 30 June 2016, the eighteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to paragraph (a) of annex I to Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) was submitted to the Security Council Committee. A table of recommendations based on the report was also circulated to the Committee, on 3 August 2016, on which the Committee deliberated during its informal consultations, on 8 August 2016, and in follow-up discussions. The Committee would like to express its gratitude to the Monitoring Team for the work undertaken in pursuance of its mandate.

2. Since December 2005, as a matter of practice, the Committee has responded to each report submitted to it by the Monitoring Team, bringing to the attention of the Security Council and the public the Committee's position on the recommendations contained in those reports.

Position of the Committee on the recommendations contained in the eighteenth report (S/2016/629) of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

Recommendation to the Committee	*Position of the Committee*
Impact assessment	
1. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee task the Team with developing a self-reporting tool in the form of a voluntary questionnaire, to encourage Member States to report on the impact of resolutions 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015) on the threat from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and associated entities, ANF (Jabhat Fath al-Sham) and foreign terrorist fighters.	The Committee agrees to task the Monitoring Team with developing a self-reporting tool in the form of a voluntary questionnaire, to encourage Member States to report on the impact of resolutions 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015) on the threat from foreign terrorist fighters, ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated entities. Following Committee approval, the Chair is to circulate the questionnaire to Member States and add it to the Committee's website.
Asset freeze	
2. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee inform Member States and maintain on its website a list of oilfields and related infrastructure under the control of ISIL or any other listed group associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida, in order to ensure a harmonized global process through which such information would be transmitted to Member States and to the relevant industries.	The Committee took note of the recommendation.

Recommendation to the Committee	*Position of the Committee*
3. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee inform Member States and maintain on its website an illustrative list of hydrocarbon-related equipment, spare parts and chemicals that ISIL may be seeking to acquire, in order to ensure a harmonized global process through which such information would be transmitted to Member States and to the relevant industries.	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so to draw up, if available and on a national basis, a list of hydrocarbon-related equipment, spare parts and chemicals that ISIL may be seeking to acquire, in order to ensure a harmonized global process through which such information would be shared with relevant parties. A note verbale to all Member States was dispatched on 14 November 2016.
4. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so to provide, where available and on a national basis, to financial institutions and related industry associations operating within their jurisdictions lists with identifying information of financial institutions operating within territory controlled by ISIL.	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so to provide, where available and on a national basis, to financial institutions and related industry associations operating within their jurisdictions lists with identifying information of financial institutions operating within territory controlled by ISIL. A note verbale to all Member States was dispatched on 14 November 2016.
5. The Monitoring Team, in line with paragraph 24 of resolution 2253 (2015), recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging them to build stronger relationships with the private sector to counter the financing of ISIL and other listed groups and communicate potential terrorist financing risk indicators to the private sector. The Financial Action Task Force has drafted a report on such indicators that could serve as a starting point for Member States.	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States encouraging them to build appropriate relationships with the private sector to counter the financing of ISIL and other listed groups and communicate potential terrorist financing risk indicators to the private sector. The Committee also agrees that the Chair should also draw the attention of Member States to a report on such indicators drafted by the Financial Action Task Force that could serve as a starting point for Member States. A note verbale to all Member States was dispatched on 14 November 2016.
6. The Monitoring Team, in line with paragraph 25 of resolution 2253 (2015), recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so to review their relevant laws and regulations to ensure that the necessary exemptions, carve-outs and safe harbours are in place to allow for the effective sharing of financial information pertaining to terrorist financing.	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States encouraging them, in compliance with their relevant laws and regulations, to strengthen the sharing of financial information pertaining to terrorist financing. A note verbale to all Member States was dispatched on 14 November 2016.

Recommendation to the Committee	*Position of the Committee*
7. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging them to explore possibilities to create additional subcategories under headings 97.05 and 97.06 in the Harmonized System Nomenclature and Classification of Goods of the World Customs Organization (WCO).	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States encouraging them to explore possibilities to create additional subcategories under headings 97.05 and 97.06 in the WCO Harmonized System Nomenclature and Classification of Goods. A note verbale to all Member States was dispatched on 14 November 2016.
8. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging them to raise awareness among the relevant customs and law enforcement agencies of the WCO ARCHEO platform with a view to its wider use and also encouraging them to share data on seizures through the WCO Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) seizures database.	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States outlining the difficulties in detecting and preventing the smuggling of antiquities by ISIL as a source of revenue generation for the group, the need for greater efforts, and encouraging them to raise awareness among the relevant customs and law enforcement agencies of the WCO ARCHEO platform with a view to its wider use and also encouraging them to share data on seizures through the WCO CEN seizures database. A note verbale to all Member States was dispatched on 14 November 2016.
9. To strengthen the compliance systems of business entities in the antiquities market, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so to provide, where available and on a national basis, to relevant industry stakeholders and associations operating within their jurisdiction, lists of archaeological sites, museums and excavation storage houses that are located in territory under the control of ISIL or any other listed group.	The Committee took note of the recommendation.
10. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so to engage relevant business associations and antiquities market participants to agree on minimum standards of provenance documentation, differentiated due diligence and know-your-customer procedures and a minimum	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so to engage relevant business associations and antiquities market participants to agree on minimum standards of provenance documentation, differentiated due diligence and know-your-customer procedures and a minimum period during which documentation pertaining to the sale of antiquities should be retained by sellers, noting the importance of industry awareness of potential supplier risks.

Recommendation to the Committee	*Position of the Committee*
period during which documentation pertaining to the sale of antiquities should be retained by sellers.	A note verbale to all Member States was dispatched on 14 November 2016.
Travel ban	
11. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so to submit to the Team and the Security Council Affairs Division the fingerprints of listed individuals, if available, for inclusion in the INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices in the ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007 format.	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States encouraging those that have not yet done so to submit to the Monitoring Team and the Security Council Affairs Division the fingerprints of listed individuals, if available, for inclusion in the INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices in the ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007 format. A note verbale to all Member States was dispatched on 14 November 2016.
Arms embargo	
12. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to INTERPOL encouraging it to work with relevant Member States to establish a specialized project focusing on enabling Member States to share data concerning components and designs of improvised explosive devices.	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to INTERPOL encouraging it to work with interested Member States through the framework of the Global Alliance Strategy to Counter IEDs to enable Member States to share data on improvised explosive devices. A letter to the Secretary-General of INTERPOL was dispatched on 11 November 2016.
13. The Monitoring Team also recommends that the Committee write to Member States highlighting the usefulness of INTERPOL Orange and Purple Notices, which allow Member States to share information and data on technical aspects of improvised explosive devices,[a] and encouraging Member States to actively use the Notices to that effect.	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States highlighting the usefulness of INTERPOL Orange and Purple Notices, which allow Member States to share information and data on technical aspects of improvised explosive devices and encouraging Member States to actively use the Notices to that effect. A note verbale to all Member States was dispatched on 14 November 2016.
Foreign terrorist fighters	
14. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States encouraging them to further share identities with the INTERPOL foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) database and encouraging those that have not yet done so to explore avenues as to how relevant	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States encouraging them to further share identities with the INTERPOL FTF database and encourage those that have not yet done so to explore avenues as to how relevant information gathered from returnees could be shared, as appropriate, with Member States along the travel route and with Member States in which the returnees previously operated.

Recommendation to the Committee	*Position of the Committee*
information gathered from returnees could be shared, as appropriate, with Member States along the travel route and with Member States in which the returnees previously operated.	A note verbale to all Member States was dispatched on 14 November 2016.
Information and communications technology	
15. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States highlighting the challenge of the increasing misuse of information and communications technology (ICT) by ISIL, Al-Qaida and associates and inviting them to share relevant best practices and experiences with the Committee and the Team. Furthermore, the Team recommends that the Committee mandate the Team to further engage with ICT industry stakeholders on potential ways to enable them to counter the threat more effectively.	The Committee agrees that the Chair should write to Member States, in collaboration with the Chair of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee and after the special meeting of that Committee on preventing terrorists from exploiting the Internet and social media to recruit terrorists and incite terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, held on 1 December 2016, highlighting the challenge presented by the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. The Committee also mandates the Monitoring Team to further engage with ICT industry stakeholders, in close collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, on potential ways to enable them to counter the threat more effectively, with a view to briefing the Committee on relevant developments.

[a] Orange Notices allow the sharing of information concerning an event, a person, an object or a process representing a serious and imminent threat to public safety. Purple Notices allow the sharing of information concerning modus operandi, objects, devices and concealment methods. See www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notices.

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Security Council

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30 November 2016

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Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a document of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities (see annex), presenting its position on the recommendations of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, submitted pursuant to paragraph 95 of resolution 2253 (2015) (see S/2016/210, annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex would be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Gerard **van Bohemen**
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

16-21093 (E) 021216

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Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council

Position of the Committee on the recommendations of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, submitted pursuant to paragraph 95 of resolution 2253 (2015)

1. On 19 January 2016, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted to the Committee a report containing its recommendations on measures that could be taken to strengthen the monitoring of global implementation of Security Council resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2199 (2015) and additional steps that could be taken by the Committee to improve global compliance with those resolutions, pursuant to the request made by the Council in paragraph 95 of its resolution 2253 (2015). The Committee deliberated on the recommendations in the context of its informal consultations held on 22 February 2016, as well as in follow-up discussions. On 29 February 2016, the recommendations were transmitted to the Security Council and were subsequently issued as a document of the Council (S/2016/210). The Committee would like to express its gratitude to the Monitoring Team for the work undertaken in the fulfilment of its mandate.

2. Since December 2005, the Committee has established the practice of responding to each of the reports submitted to it by the Monitoring Team and bringing to the attention of the Security Council the position of the Committee on the recommendations contained therein. The following table sets out the position of the Committee on the recommendations of the Monitoring Team.

Position of the Committee on the recommendations of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, submitted pursuant to paragraph 95 of resolution 2253 (2015)

Recommendation of the Monitoring Team	*Position of the Committee*
Monitoring relating to the illicit trade in oil and oil products	
1. In order to collect specific information about illicit structures used by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to trade oil and in order to explore opportunities to increase the effectiveness of existing monitoring mechanisms, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee mandate the Monitoring Team to convene a technical meeting with participants from oil ministries of the Member States in the conflict zone as well as those neighbouring the conflict zone and to report to the Committee on its findings.	The Committee mandates the Monitoring Team to meet with participants from oil ministries of relevant Member States and to report to the Committee on its findings.

Recommendation of the Monitoring Team	*Position of the Committee*
Monitoring relating to the misuse of financial services by ISIL (Da'esh)	
2. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee invite the President of the Financial Action Task Force to brief the Committee in further detail on the ongoing activities of the Task Force aimed at countering the financing of terrorism, including with respect to ISIL and the financing of foreign terrorist fighters, and to discuss further measures that could be taken to strengthen the monitoring of the global implementation of the financing-related provisions of Security Council resolutions 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015). Such a briefing could potentially be held while the President is in New York for the open briefing or at a different time, depending on the schedules of the President and the Committee.	The Committee agrees to invite the President of the Task Force to provide a briefing on the ongoing activities of the Task Force aimed at countering the financing of terrorism, including with respect to ISIL and the financing of foreign terrorist fighters, and to discuss further measures that could be taken to strengthen the monitoring of the global implementation of the financing-related provisions of resolutions 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015). On 14 April 2016, the Committee held a joint open briefing with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the President of the Task Force on countering the financing of terrorism and depriving terrorist groups, in particular Al-Qaeda, ISIL (Da'esh) and their affiliates, from their sources of funding. The Committee intends to hold a similar meeting in December 2016 on lessons learned, subject to the no-objection procedure.
Monitoring relating to the illicit trade in cultural property	
3. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee mandate the Monitoring Team to cooperate with the World Customs Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to explore the possibility of issuing a new recommendation of the World Customs Organization highlighting the risk posed by illicit trade in looted cultural property for global financing of terrorism and to report on the progress of this cooperation.	The Committee mandates the Monitoring Team to cooperate with the World Customs Organization and UNESCO to explore the possibility of issuing a new recommendation of the World Customs Organization highlighting the risk posed by illicit trade in looted cultural property for global financing of terrorism and to report to the Committee on the progress made in the context of this cooperation.
4. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee invite UNESCO, the International Council of Museums, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and other relevant organizations to a special thematic meeting of the Committee at which they can update the Committee on their ongoing activities aimed at monitoring the international illicit trade in looted cultural property linked to ISIL and to discuss further measures that could be taken.	The Committee agrees to invite UNESCO, the International Council of Museums, INTERPOL and other relevant organizations to a special thematic meeting of the Committee at which they can update the Committee on their ongoing activities aimed at monitoring the international illicit trade in looted cultural property linked to ISIL and to discuss further measures that could be taken.

Recommendation of the Monitoring Team	*Position of the Committee*
5. Given the growing risk of terrorism financing through the illicit trade of cultural property, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage them to systematically update the INTERPOL database on stolen works of art with detailed information on objects stolen and seized from Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya.	The Committee agrees to write to Member States to encourage them to systematically update the INTERPOL database on stolen works of art with detailed information on objects stolen and seized from Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya. A note verbale to this effect was dispatched on 13 April 2016.
6. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to advise them of the risk of the looting of cultural heritage in Libya by ISIL and to encourage Member States to raise awareness with relevant authorities and business entities of the International Council of Museums Emergency Red List of Libyan Cultural Objects at Risk.	The Committee agrees to write to Member States to advise them of the risk of the looting of cultural heritage in Libya by ISIL and to encourage Member States to raise awareness with relevant authorities and business entities of the International Council of Museums Emergency Red List of Libyan Cultural Objects at Risk. A note verbale to this effect was dispatched on 13 April 2016.
7. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to highlight the risk of the potential misuse of free zones, free ports and similar customs areas by those trading in illegally obtained cultural property and to encourage those that maintain those areas, and have not yet done so, to introduce inventory lists, describing, in particular, stored cultural property so that customs agencies may be in a better position to identify potentially illicit antiquities, and to restrict the duration of storage for cultural property in order to mitigate the risk of the stockpiling of looted antiquities in those areas.	The Committee agrees to write to Member States to highlight the risk of the potential misuse of free zones, free ports and similar customs areas by those trading in illegally obtained cultural property and to encourage those that maintain those areas, and have not yet done so, to introduce inventory lists, describing, in particular, stored cultural property so that customs agencies may be in a better position to identify potentially illicit antiquities, and to restrict the duration of storage for cultural property in order to mitigate the risk of the stockpiling of looted antiquities in those areas. A note verbale to this effect was dispatched on 13 April 2016.
Recommendations relating to measures for reducing access of ISIL to arms and related materiel	
8. In order to restrict the access of ISIL to illicitly trafficked arms and precursors of improvised explosive devices, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage them to designate focal points in order to improve information-sharing and to update the relevant INTERPOL databases (Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (iArms) and the TEAL programme).	The Committee agrees to write to Member States to encourage those who have not yet done so to designate focal points in order to improve information-sharing and to update the relevant INTERPOL databases (iArms, TEAL programme), in accordance with their national legislation. A note verbale to this effect was dispatched on 13 April 2016.

Recommendation of the Monitoring Team	*Position of the Committee*
Recommendation relating to the misuse of the Internet and social media by ISIL (Da'esh)	
9. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so, and in accordance with their national legislation, to raise awareness among social media companies and other Internet service providers operating in their territory of the risk of their services being misused as operational tools and knowledge-sharing platforms for planning and preparing terrorist attacks and providing facilitation services to foreign terrorist fighters. In addition, the Committee could emphasize that Member States should encourage such business entities to exercise vigilance and remind them that, in paragraph 6 of its resolution 2253 (2015) and in prior resolutions, the Security Council clarified that the asset freeze relating to the provision of financial and economic resources of every kind includes, but is not limited to, those used for the provision of Internet hosting and related services in support of Al-Qaida, ISIL and other individuals, groups, undertakings or entities included on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.	The Committee agrees to write to Member States: (a) To encourage those that have not yet done so, in accordance with their national legislation, to raise awareness among social media companies and other Internet service providers operating in their territory of the risk of their services being misused as operational tools and knowledge-sharing platforms for planning and preparing terrorist attacks and providing facilitation services to foreign terrorist fighters; (b) To highlight that Member States should encourage such business entities to exercise vigilance; (c) To remind Member States that, in paragraph 6 of its resolution 2253 (2015) and in prior resolutions, the Security Council clarified that the asset freeze relating to the provision of financial and economic resources of every kind includes, but is not limited to, those used for the provision of Internet hosting and related services in support of Al-Qaida, ISIL and other individuals, groups, undertakings or entities included on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List. A note verbale to this effect was dispatched on 13 April 2016.
Recommendations relating to the financing of foreign terrorist fighters and financial intelligence	
10. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to emphasize the value of financial intelligence, to encourage national authorities to increase efforts to incorporate financial intelligence into their strategy for countering foreign terrorist fighters and to highlight the importance of sharing intelligence, including financial intelligence, with the relevant national authorities dealing with countering foreign terrorist fighters, including financial intelligence units and border and law enforcement agencies.	The Committee takes note of the recommendation.

Recommendation of the Monitoring Team	*Position of the Committee*
11. Given the abuse of credit facilities by foreign terrorist fighters, the Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage them to raise awareness of this risk among institutions engaged in the business of lending, especially small credit institutions that charge higher interest rates, to ensure that they are aware of this practice and exercise the necessary due diligence.	The Committee agrees to write to Member States to encourage them to raise awareness of this risk among institutions engaged in the business of lending, especially small credit institutions that charge higher interest rates, to ensure that they are aware of the practice and exercise the necessary due diligence. A note verbale to this effect was dispatched on 13 April 2016.
Recommendations relating to foreign terrorist fighters	
12. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so, and in accordance with their national legislation, to raise the awareness of business entities that provide maritime travel services and land-based travel services, such as bus companies, of the importance of exercising vigilance against the misuse of their services by foreign terrorist fighters and to highlight the important role that border management agencies, such as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), could play in countering the global threat of such fighters.	The Committee agrees to write to Member States, encouraging those that have not yet done so and in accordance with their national legislation, to raise the awareness of business entities providing maritime travel services and land-based travel services, such as bus companies, of the importance of vigilance against the misuse of their services by foreign terrorist fighters and to highlight the important role that border management agencies, such as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), could play in countering the global threat of such fighters. A note verbale to this effect was dispatched on 13 April 2016
13. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so to actively participate in the INTERPOL database on foreign terrorist fighters.	The Committee agrees to write to Member States to encourage those that have not yet done so to actively participate in the INTERPOL database on foreign terrorist fighters. A note verbale to this effect was dispatched on 13 April 2016.
14. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to the designating States of the individuals listed on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and encourage them to ascertain whether the individuals that they have proposed for designation on the Sanctions List could be considered foreign terrorist fighters under Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) and, if they can be so considered, to submit information concerning those individuals for inclusion in the INTERPOL database on foreign terrorist fighters.	The Committee agrees to write to the designating States of the individuals listed on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and encourage them to ascertain whether the individuals that they have proposed for designation on the Sanctions List could be considered foreign terrorist fighters under Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) and, if they can be so considered, to submit information concerning those individuals for inclusion in the INTERPOL database on foreign terrorist fighters. Letters were dispatched on 15 April 2016.

Recommendation of the Monitoring Team	*Position of the Committee*
15. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to INTERPOL to secure the organization's agreement to provide access to the analytical reports generated on the basis of information provided by Member States to the INTERPOL database on foreign terrorist fighters, to the current INTERPOL licence-holders of the Security Council Affairs Division who are supporting the Monitoring Team.	The Committee agrees to write to INTERPOL to secure the organization's agreement to provide access to the analytical reports generated on the basis of information provided by Member States to the INTERPOL database on foreign terrorist fighters, to the current INTERPOL licence-holders of the Security Council Affairs Division who are supporting the Monitoring Team. A letter was dispatched on 13 April 2016.

United Nations S/2016/1007

Security Council

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30 November 2016

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Note verbale dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Sudan to the United Nations presents its compliments to Fodé Seck, President of the Security Council for the month of November 2016, and has the honour to forward the final position of the Republic of South Sudan on the implementation of the joint Transitional Government of National Unity-Security Council communiqué concerning the deployment of the regional protection force (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Sudan to the United Nations further seeks your assistance in circulating the aforementioned agreement among the members of the Security Council as a document of the Council.

16-21103 (E) 021216

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Annex to the note verbale dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Mission of South Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Modalities for the implementation of the joint Transitional Government of National Unity-United Nations Security Council communiqué of 4 September 2016 (issued on 30 November)

Cognizant of the critical importance of the Joint Transitional Government of National Unity-United Nations Security Council communiqué of 4 September 2016 in the achievement of durable peace in the Republic of South Sudan, and recalling the commitment of the Security Council to the sovereignty, freedom and independence of South Sudan,

Aware of the need for expeditious agreement on the strategies and modalities for the implementation of the contents of said communiqué,

The Transitional Government and the Security Council having harmonized understanding on the wording of Security Council resolution 2304 (2016), discussed the areas of relevance to the unimpeded implementation by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) of its mandate and further discussed issues relating to humanitarian access, the parties agree as follows:

1. A "one-stop shop" shall be established within the premises of UNMISS to act as a single entry point to process, expedite and ease tax exemptions and security clearances for all goods and equipment imported by and on behalf of UNMISS, the elimination of illegal taxes and fees and the review of modalities to streamline bureaucratic processes that hinder UNMISS operations;

(a) UNMISS shall provide detailed information of all imports to allow time for necessary procedures within the one-stop shop, and the Transitional Government agrees to work with UNMISS to achieve the objectives of the one-stop shop;

2. On the UNMISS mandate:

(a) Notwithstanding the unrestricted freedom of movement of UNMISS, written notification, ideally within 72 hours, shall be submitted routinely for convoys and patrols so that the relevant authorities can communicate UNMISS intent to local units;

(b) The Transitional Government agrees to planned UNMISS visits, notification of which will be communicated in advance indicating the date, location and troop type;

(c) In case of emergency, UNMISS will notify the authorized officer(s) who will, in turn, deal with the case as quickly as possible according to its severity/merits and circumstances;

(d) Aircraft landing clearance during an emergency shall be communicated to the Civil Aviation Authority to coordinate with the security authorities concerned;

3. On checkpoints and patrols:

(a) The Transitional Government agrees to the establishment of seven checkpoints along the seven arterial routes in and out of Juba, under the jurisdiction of the South Sudan National Police Service;

(b) UNMISS and the regional protection force may observe government operations at checkpoints without prejudice to its mandate in order to facilitate free and safe movement by protecting routes into, out of and around Juba;

(c) In the conduct of routine and discretionary patrolling in Juba, UNMISS shall cooperate and coordinate with the Transitional Government, including through the Joint Operations Centre to which UNMISS has assigned liaison officers;

4. On the protection of key facilities/installations and Juba International Airport:

(a) The Transitional Government and UNMISS shall conduct coordinated protection of agreed installations and facilities essential to the well-being of the people of Juba. The joint technical working group is to continue to develop the requisite practical arrangements, involving all stakeholders;

(b) The Transitional Government agrees to coordinated protection of Juba International Airport. A joint security assessment shall be conducted to determine the optimal coordinated protection in accordance with Security Council resolution 2304 (2016);

(c) It is agreed that UNMISS will undertake to provide a rough terrain patrol track around the airport perimeter. UNMISS shall continue to train the fire service, and the Transitional Government agrees to the use by UNMISS of its assets located at the airfield to provide fire and other emergency support in the event of a crisis;

5. On the regional protection force:

(a) The Transitional Government agrees to the deployment of 4,000 regional protection forces, comprising approximately 2,200 from three troop-contributing countries (Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda) and approximately 1,800 enablers;

(b) The regional protection force shall carry standard equipment and weapons, the list of which shall be submitted according to current UNMISS procedures. The list of troops contributing contingent-owned equipment being deployed as part of the force shall be forwarded to the Transitional Government for expeditious clearance once confirmed by the Headquarters and the contributing nation;

(c) The Transitional Government agrees to provide land for the regional protection force and has directed the Government of Jubek State to allow UNMISS to carry out site visits at the three potential force base locations and to engage UNMISS on its proposal for a fourth site in or around Juba north of Juba city;

6. On unhindered and unrestricted humanitarian assistance, the Transitional Government agrees to the establishment of a non-governmental organizations (NGOs) desk or humanitarian one-stop shop to which qualified and competent staff from the relevant government institutions, United Nations agencies and NGOs shall be deployed in order to achieve the objectives of Presidential Order No. 23/2016. The Transitional Government will ensure that the intentions and proposals for

unhindered and unrestricted humanitarian assistance are implemented without further impediments.

(*Signed*) Martin Elia **Lomurö**
Minister of Cabinet Affairs
Chairperson of the Communiqué Implementation Committee

UNMISS regional protection force: key enablers — armaments and equipment

Table 1
High readiness company: armaments and equipment

No.	*Equipment/armaments*	*Quantity*	*Remarks*	*Comments*
1	Crew-served machine guns (up to 10 mm)	40	Vehicle-mounted (30)	Agreed
2	Crew-served machine guns (11 to 15 mm)			Agreed
3	Mortars (up to 60 mm)	3		Agreed
4	Mortars (61 to 82 mm)	2		Agreed
5	Recoilless gun	5		Agreed
6	Anti-tank grenade launcher (light, 60 to 80 mm)	15		Agreed
Armoured personnel carriers (wheeled)				
7	Infantry carrier, armed (classes I to III)	8		Agreed
8	Command post	2		Agreed
9	**Support Vehicles (military pattern)**			Agreed
10	Ambulance	2		Agreed
11	Jeep (4x4) with military radio	5		Agreed
12	Truck, utility/cargo (jeep type) (under 1.5 tons)	15		Agreed
13	Truck utility/cargo (1.5 to 2.4 tons)	5		Agreed
14	Truck maintenance (medium)	1		Agreed
15	Truck, refrigerator (under 20 feet)	1		Agreed
16	Truck, water (more than 5,000 litres, up to 10,000 litres)	1		Agreed
17	Truck tanker (more than 5,000 litres, up to 10,000 litres)	1		Agreed
Medical and dental equipment				Agreed
18	Level 1 hospital	1		Agreed
19	**Water storage equipment**			Agreed
20	Water storage, greater than 20,000 litres	1		Agreed
21	**Engineering equipment**			Agreed
22	Water treatment plant, up to 2,000 litres per hour, storage up to 5,000 litres	1	Water treatment plant	Agreed
23	201 to 500 kVA	2		Agreed
24	31 to 40 kVA	4		Agreed
25	41 to 50 kVA	4		Agreed
26	51 to 75 kVA	4		Agreed
Material handling equipment				
27	Forklift, rough terrain (more than 5 tons)	2		Agreed
28	**Trailers**			Agreed
29	Fuel trailer (2,000 to 7,000 litres)	3		Agreed
30	Water trailer (2,000 to 7,000 litres)	3		Agreed

No.	Equipment/armaments	Quantity	Remarks	Comments
31	Light cargo, single axle	6		Agreed
32	Medium cargo, single axle	2		Agreed
33	**Containers**			Agreed
34	Other containers	4		Agreed
35	Ammunition storage container	1		Agreed
36	Accommodation equipment			Agreed
37	Tents for deployable platoon, 35 personnel	4		Agreed
38	Ablution facilities (50 persons)	3		Agreed

Table 2
Tactical helicopter unit: armaments and equipment

No.	Equipment	Quantity	Remarks	Comments
1	Attack helicopters	2	Mi-24 Hind E (Rwanda)	Agreed
Armament				
2	Rocket pods	4	57 mm rockets (32); 80 mm rockets (20)	Agreed
3	12.7 mm machine gun	1		Agreed
Support vehicles (commercial)				
4	Truck, water (more than 5,000 litres, up to 10,000 litres)	1	With pumps	Agreed
5	Trucks, tanker (more than 5,000 litres, up to 10,000 litres)	1	All with pumps and flow metres (1 for diesel and 1 for aviation fuel)	Agreed
Support vehicles (military pattern)				
6	Jeep 4x4	2	With military radio	Agreed
7	Minibus 4x4	1		Agreed
8	Truck, utility/cargo (2.4 to 5 tons)	1		Agreed
9	Truck, utility/cargo (6 to 10 tons)	1		Agreed
10	Truck, maintenance (medium)	1		Agreed
11	Truck, sewage	1		Agreed
12	**Engineering vehicles**			Agreed
13	Crane, mobile, medium (11 to 24 tons)	1		Agreed
Engineering equipment				Agreed
14	Water treatment plant (reverse osmosis water purification unit), up to 2,000 litres per hour, storage up to 5,000 litres	1		Agreed
15	Generator, 41 to 50 kVA	2	Troop-contributing countries need to select generator size to match specific loads	Agreed
16	Generator, 51 to 75 kVA	2		Agreed
Logistical equipment				Agreed
17	Tentage	1		Agreed

No.	Equipment	Quantity	Remarks	Comments
18	Ablution Unit	1		Agreed
19	Water storage (up to 10,000 litres)	2	Collapsible, specially certified for water storage	Agreed
Material handling equipment				
19	Forklift, rough terrain (up to 5 tons)	1		Agreed
20	Aircraft/airfield support equipment			Agreed
21	Auxiliary power unit (small capacity)	2		Agreed
22	Tractor, aircraft towing	1		Agreed
23	Trailer, aircraft loading	1		Agreed
Trailers				
24	Water trailer (up to 2,000 litres)	1		Agreed
25	Compressor trailer	1		Agreed
Communications equipment				
26	Air-ground base station transceiver (AM/FM)	2		Agreed
27	Base station transmitter, HF, high power	2		Agreed
28	Satellite phones	4	1 per aircraft, 1 for main base, 1 for detachment	Agreed
Miscellaneous equipment				
29	Light projector with generators (special case)	2		Agreed
30	Containers			Agreed
31	Other containers	7		Agreed
32	Ammunition storage	1	Number of containers to be communicated with troop-contributing countries	Agreed

Table 3
Infantry battalion major equipment requirements

No.	Item	Quantity	Remarks	Comments
1	Crew-served machine guns (up to 10 mm)	52		Agreed
2	Crew-served machine guns (11 to 15 mm)	27		Agreed
3	Mortars (up to 60 mm)	16		Agreed
4	Mortars (61 to 82 mm)	6		Agreed
5	Anti-tank grenade launcher (light, 60 to 80 mm)	52		Agreed
6	Infantry carrier, armed (class III)	16		Agreed
7	Command post	5		Agreed
8	Ambulance rescue	4		Agreed
9	Ambulance	2		Agreed
10	Jeep (4x4) with military radio	35		Agreed
11	Truck, utility/cargo (1.5 to 2.4 tons)	55		Agreed

No	*Item*	*Quantity*	*Remarks*	*Comments*
12	Truck, utility/cargo (7 to 10 tons)	30		Agreed
13	Truck, maintenance, medium	6		Agreed
14	Truck, water (more than 10,000 litres)	6		Agreed
15	Remote control bomb disposal equipment	1		Agreed
16	Metal detectors	12		Agreed
17	Explosive ordnance disposal suit, light (minimum V-50 ballistic test rating of 1,000 for the chest and groin)	5		Agreed
18	Demining protective helmet and visor	5		Agreed
19	Demining protective shoes	5		Agreed
20	Demining protective vest/jacket	5		Agreed
21	Demining protective apron/trousers	5		Agreed
22	Reinforced gloves (pair)	5		Agreed
23	Demining protective helmet and visor	1		Agreed
24	Demining protective shoes	1		Agreed
25	Demining protective vest/jacket or demining protective apron/trousers (alternatives)	1		Agreed
26	Reinforced gloves (pair)	1		Agreed
27	Personal equipment (with gas mask) — set of 10 — applicable to military contingents with riot control tasks only	9		Agreed
28	Teargas launcher (set of 4)	3		Agreed
29	Loudspeakers (set of 3)	3		Agreed
30	Handheld searchlights (set of 6)	3		Agreed
31	Handheld metal detectors (set of 6)	3		Agreed
32	Flare/signal pistol (set of 3)	3		Agreed
33	Taser (advanced pistol) (set of 1)	3		Agreed
34	Searchlights and generators	3		Agreed
35	Automatic (TG) grenade launcher (set of 3)	3		Agreed
36	Public address system (set)	3		Agreed
37	Water treatment plant (reverse osmosis water purification unit or equivalent), equipment, tanks and bladders, up to 2,000 litres per hour, storage up to 5,000 litres			Agreed
38	Water storage, 7,001 to 10,000 litres	20		Agreed
39	Fuel storage, 5,001 to 10,000 litres	8		Agreed
40	Generators — stationary and mobile			Agreed
	20 to 30 kVA	18	Mobile on board/or towed	Agreed
41	31 to 40 kVA	4		Agreed
42	51 to 75 kVA	4		Agreed
43	101 to 150 kVA	4		Agreed
44	201 to 500 kVA	6		Agreed
45	Telephone exchange, private automatic branch exchange, 1 to 100 lines	1		Agreed

No.	*Item*	*Quantity*	*Remarks*	*Comments*
46	Medical and dental			Agreed
47	Level 1 hospital	1		Agreed
48	Tents for deployable squad, 8 to 10 personnel	9		Agreed
49	Tents for deployable platoon, 35 personnel	9		Agreed
50	Semi-rigid structures			Agreed
51	Ablution facilities (50 persons)	17		Agreed
52	Ammunition magazine (storage)	8		Agreed
53	Refrigeration/freezer/food storage	8		Agreed
54	Other containers	25		Agreed

United Nations S/2016/1008

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 November 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey the following information:

In the framework of the great efforts exerted by the Syrian Government to alleviate the suffering of tens of thousands of civilians from the eastern part of Aleppo, and to provide them with the necessary daily life needs, after rescuing them from the horror of the terrorist armed groups, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates requested the office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Damascus in its official note No. 2901 dated 30 November 2016 to participate in these relief efforts, to use the warehouse stocks of the United Nations in Aleppo City, and to use any other available relief to respond to essential needs of the civilians. In this regard, the Syrian Government assured the Resident Coordinator that it will provide safety and security measures to the humanitarian personnel who will participate in this effort in the areas controlled by the Syrian Arab Army in Aleppo. In addition to that, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates approved the request of the Resident Coordinator in Damascus to visit Aleppo City tomorrow, Thursday 1 December 2016.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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United Nations S/2016/1009

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 December 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 1 December 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to refer to Security Council resolution 2313 (2016), in which the Council took note of my intention to develop a package that would provide material assistance and support to those Haitians directly affected by cholera. The present letter lays out the details of the new approach. Further details are being provided to the General Assembly in my report (A/71/620).

The United Nations has always been in Haiti for one reason: to assist the people in building a better future and fulfilling their democratic aspirations. Since 2004, these efforts have been carried out in part by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, working alongside the United Nations country team.

The people of Haiti have faced many challenges during that time, including endemic poverty, political instability and vacuums of governance. These challenges have been compounded by the devastating earthquake in 2010 and, more recently, by Hurricane Matthew. The United Nations has responded to these challenges in solidarity with the people of Haiti.

One challenge, however, has cast a shadow. Cholera broke out in Haiti in October 2010. Coming only nine months after the earthquake, this was an additional blow for which Haiti was ill prepared. Only one quarter of the population has access to decent toilets and one half to clean water, making it the country with the poorest water and sanitation system in the western hemisphere. Cholera ultimately afflicted nearly 800,000 people and may have caused more than 9,000 deaths.

From the outset, the United Nations, with support from the international community, devoted considerable effort and resources to respond, providing emergency health and humanitarian measures to reduce transmission. Over the following six years, various initiatives were undertaken to mobilize the resources and interventions necessary for the elimination of the disease from the country.

I visited Haiti several times to assess the situation and to demonstrate my solidarity with the people. I appointed a series of high-level officials to raise the profile of the issue and to bring in extra funding.

Thanks to such concerted international and Haitian efforts, the overall incidence of the disease has been reduced by approximately 90 per cent since its peak in 2011.

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However, these efforts have not been enough.

Cholera continues to take a heavy toll on the lives of the people of Haiti, and Haiti is still reporting the highest number of cholera cases in the world. Already in 2016, we have seen a rise in cases, directly attributable to reduced funding, which has resulted in a deterioration in the capacity to respond to and treat cholera.

Convinced that we needed to do more, on 19 August 2016, I announced a new approach to cholera in Haiti to concretely demonstrate deep regret for the suffering of the Haitian people as a result of the epidemic. I will speak further on this when I address the General Assembly on 1 December.

The new approach has two tracks. Track 1 consists of a greatly intensified and better-resourced effort to respond to and reduce the incidence of cholera in Haiti. This is the most meaningful contribution that the United Nations can make. The aim is to significantly improve access to care and treatment and to address the longer-term issues of water, sanitation and health-care systems. Work on track 1 is well under way and is detailed in my report to the General Assembly.

Cholera can be controlled and eliminated with sufficient funds to ensure proper and timely treatment. I have established the United Nations Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund to provide a channel for funding for both tracks of the new approach. To date, funding shortages have made it impossible to fully treat or eliminate what is generally a treatable and preventable disease. Hurricane Matthew, which destroyed much of the south-west of the country, has contributed to a doubling of the number of suspected cholera cases per month, from a little more than 2,000 in September to nearly 6,000 in early November 2016. Our fundraising efforts therefore continue with great urgency.

In addition to the forward-looking steps under track 1, my new approach includes a second track that focuses specifically on those Haitians most directly affected by cholera, their families and communities, and will provide a package of material assistance and support.

Track 2 would consist of a community-based approach whereby affected communities would receive assistance and support through community-based projects and initiatives that are responsive to priorities articulated by the communities themselves and linked in general to and coordinated with work under track 1.

Consideration was given to an individual approach for the households of those who died of cholera; however, we discovered that there would be substantial difficulties involved, including in identifying those who died and their family members. Such an approach would require further exploration, including through on-the-ground consultations with victims and their communities, while recognizing the challenges, risks and constraints.

I am committed to engaging affected communities in the design of track 2. However, to engage in consultations, and thereby raise expectations, without any assurance of funding would be counterproductive. The limited responses in fundraising for the response to Hurricane Matthew and cholera elimination have highlighted the reality in which we are working.

The consensus view expressed during the preliminary consultations is that the two overriding priorities for Haiti are to eliminate cholera and to respond to the devastating effects of Hurricane Matthew. The new approach of the United Nations, contained in my report to the General Assembly, is premised on the assumption that sufficient additional voluntary funding will be made available to deliver on track 2 without detracting from track 1. However, the possibility that the incoming Secretary-General may need to propose a multi-funded approach cannot be excluded.

Eliminating cholera from Haiti and living up to our moral duty to those who have been most directly affected is a collective responsibility of the Organization. It will require the full commitment of the international community. Our response is a test of our commitment to the most vulnerable of those whom we serve. It is also important for the global reputation of peacekeeping.

The people of Haiti deserve this tangible expression of our solidarity and the genuine support that comes with it.

I intend to proceed with the implementation of the new approach, to the extent that it falls within my purview.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

United Nations S/2016/1010

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 December 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Please find enclosed a copy of a letter sent to the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien, regarding the briefing by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs delivered at the Security Council meeting on the situation in the Middle East held on 23 November 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing with regard to the statement delivered by you at the Security Council meeting on the situation in the Middle East held on 23 November 2016. Regrettably, this briefing failed to provide a complete picture of the situation on the ground and transgressed the principles of impartiality and neutrality expected from a United Nations organization.

First, your description of the reason for Israeli regulations on the entry of humanitarian personnel into Gaza was dismissive of Israel's genuine security concerns. By placing "security" in quotes, you cast unjustifiable doubt on the motivation behind those regulations and ignore the reality Israel faces on a daily basis.

It should be made abundantly clear that the terror organization Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, poses a dire threat to the safety and security of Israeli citizens. The rockets fired at Israel and the discovery of terror tunnels in the past year demonstrate that Hamas is actively preparing for another conflict. This is the same organization that is known to have exploited humanitarian agencies to divert materials for its military build-up. Hamas regularly confiscates, diverts and smuggles resources dedicated to the reconstruction of Gaza and rededicates them to its priorities: digging terror tunnels, constructing training camps and manufacturing rockets. In the light of such threats, Israel must protect its citizens by ensuring that humanitarian activity is not being misused or exploited.

Second, a factor that was completely missing from the briefing was a description of the significant steps Israel is taking to facilitate the reconstruction of Gaza, even as it deals with deep and tangible security concerns. There was no mention of the daily efforts of Israeli authorities to ensure that supplies and materials reach those who need them in Gaza or of the long-term projects Israel promotes for critical infrastructure, such as water and electricity.

Every single day, 800 trucks go through the Kerem Shalom and Erez crossings into the Gaza Strip. Israel is working to increase that capacity to 1,000 trucks per day. Thus far, Israel has facilitated the transfer of over 6 million tons of building materials for the reconstruction mechanism, including 4.7 million tons of aggregates, over 1 million tons of cement and 190,000 tons of iron. If need be, Israel can provide a specific list of humanitarian relief actions it has been conducting to promote the well-being of the people of Gaza.

Third, regarding humanitarian activity in Area C, it should be made clear that the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other humanitarian actors are well aware that the delivery of aid should be coordinated with Israel in advance. Those who choose to take one-sided actions without coordination with Israel do so out of sheer political motivations, at the expense of the vulnerable communities that they profess to protect. As you stated yourself, these vulnerable civilians have no place as instruments in a political strategy. We expect OCHA to heed to its own advice.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the purpose of your address to the Council on that occasion was to offer a factual briefing, describing the humanitarian situation on the ground. Your appeal to the Council advocating political action not only is contrary to that purpose but also undermines and politicizes the role of OCHA as a humanitarian organization.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2016/1011

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 December 2016

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2291 (2016) of 13 June 2016. It covers major political and security developments in Libya, provides an overview of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the country and outlines the activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) since the issuance of my report of 16 May 2016 (S/2016/452).

II. Political and security-related developments

2. Efforts to implement the Libyan Political Agreement of December 2015 have continued, despite the deeply challenging political and security context. The Presidency Council worked to expand its authority and govern, but continued to face a number of setbacks. The House of Representatives met on 22 August to discuss the proposal for a new Government of National Accord, presented by Prime Minister Faiez Serraj, and a majority of those voting rejected the proposal. Other important elements of the Agreement remain unimplemented, including the interim security arrangements, while the security situation remains very challenging. Limited access to financial resources hampered the ability of the Presidency Council to deliver basic services.

3. After the House of Representatives voted to reject the proposed Government, the Presidency Council initiated consultations on a new proposal. The formation of a new Government is one of a number of contentious issues requiring resolution. There are serious differences between the supporters of the Presidency Council and the leadership of the House of Representatives over the composition and functions of the Presidency Council itself. The structure and command of the Libyan armed forces and appointments to senior military and civilian leadership positions are other key issues.

Implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement

4. The House of Representatives remained unable to meet to amend the Constitutional Amendment in order to constitutionalize the institutions emanating from the Libyan Political Agreement. Furthermore, the absence of approval by the

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House of Representatives for the proposed Government of National Accord led the Presidency Council to instruct designated ministers to continue to perform their functions in a caretaker capacity until a new Government was put in place.

5. Parallel institutions remained in place, attempting to assert authority despite their lack of legal status under the Libyan Political Agreement. The Bayda-based "interim Government" refused to recognize the Presidency Council and continued to exercise authority in the east of the country, encouraging the operation of parallel institutions, including a branch of the Central Bank of Libya based in Benghazi. The former "Government of National Salvation" sought to make a comeback in October 2016 by retaking control of the former General National Congress premises in Tripoli, which had been used by the State Council. The ouster of the State Council led to shows of force and clashes among armed groups in the city.

6. Despite challenges to its legitimacy, the State Council continued to convene sessions in Tripoli. In response to the continued lack of a vote on the Government of National Accord, on 21 September, the State Council announced that it would exercise all its functions, as set out in the Libyan Political Agreement, until the House of Representatives reconvened. The statement was perceived by the general public as an attempt to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the House of Representatives, triggering strong reactions. However, the State Council has taken no steps in that direction since the announcement.

7. UNSMIL continued to engage closely with the leadership and senior members of the House of Representatives, to urge them to convene a legislative session. UNSMIL also convened meetings of the Libyan Political dialogue, from 16 to 18 July and on 5 and 6 September in Tunis, and on 10 and 11 November in Malta, at the request of the Presidency Council, to consult on the formation of a consensual, technically competent and inclusive Government. The members of the Libyan Political dialogue reiterated its support for the Libyan Political Agreement and for the Presidency Council and recommended measures to address ongoing challenges and drive forward implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement, underscoring the importance of accelerating the provision of basic services.

8. During the reporting period, UNSMIL continued efforts to promote unity among and the full participation of all nine members of the Presidency Council. On 8 October, the Presidency Council held its first full session with all nine of its members since February, to discuss the formation of a new Cabinet.

9. The Presidency Council, in its capacity as Supreme Commander of the Libyan armed forces, established regional operations rooms to lead and coordinate operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). UNSMIL assisted the Presidency Council in convening a high-level meeting on security, held on 17 and 18 July in Tunis, which brought together representatives from the army and police force and other security actors to further the implementation of the security arrangements provided for in the Libyan Political Agreement. The meeting provided guidance to the Presidency Council on establishing interim security structures, engagement with armed groups and the formation of a presidential guard.

Regional and international engagement

10. The Libyan political process continued to receive regional and international support. At a ministerial meeting for Libya held in Vienna on 16 May, participating

Member States and regional organizations expressed their support for the Libyan Political Agreement and for the Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate representative of the Libyan people. This support was reaffirmed at a ministerial meeting on Libya held in the margins of the general debate of the General Assembly, in New York on 22 September, at which participants welcomed the Presidency Council's leadership in the fight against terrorism and recognized the need to ensure an inclusive security dialogue.

11. My Special Representative attended the summit meeting of the League of Arab States, held in Nouakchott on 25 July, and the ninth ministerial meeting of the neighbouring countries of Libya, held in Niamey on 17 October. On 25 October, my Special Representative met with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and former President Kikwete, the African Union High Representative for Libya, to announce the formation of a "troika" to consult on the situation in Libya and advance the political process. On 7 November, my Special Representative briefed the African Union High-level Committee on Libya, in Addis Ababa.

Situation in the west

12. The security situation in Tripoli remained fragile. The Presidency Council partially moved from the Abu Sittah naval base to the office of the President of the Council in the city centre and installed itself in a number of ministries and other government buildings. The Council faced serious obstacles in implementing its mandate to govern. With only limited control on the ground and in the absence of security forces at its disposal, the Council was compelled to rely on armed groups committed to the Libyan Political Agreement for its security. Civil servants were divided between the Council and its political opponents, further complicating efforts to improve service delivery. The provision of public services in the capital, including water and electricity, deteriorated, giving rise to public protests.

13. Tripoli remained under the control of a patchwork of armed groups with differing agendas and loyalties, from both Tripoli and the surrounding areas, including Misratah. Rivalries over funding and territorial control between the groups regularly led to clashes. In June and September, elements of the Salah al-Burki brigade and the Abu Salim armed group clashed in central Tripoli, leaving at least 10 people dead. Further clashes in October, close to Tripoli's Mitiga airport, between the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade and the Yusuf al-Buni brigade, caused a number of fatalities.

14. In the wider western region, ceasefire agreements concluded between local communities in 2015 remained largely intact. However, clashes in Sabrathah caused at least four further fatalities in June. Between July and late October, clashes and reprisals between rival communities in Zawiyah reportedly resulted in several casualties, before the parties agreed to a ceasefire agreement on 1 November. Parts of the main coastal highway connecting Tripoli to the west of the country and Tunisia remained closed by rival armed groups for most of the reporting period.

Situation in the east

15. Fighting continued in Benghazi between Libyan National Army forces loyal to the House of Representatives and groups including ISIL and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council — a coalition of Islamist armed groups that includes

Ansar al-Sharia, an entity designated by the Security Council as associated with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Fighting centred on the Suq al-Hut, Qawarshah and Qanfudah districts, and Libyan National Army forces made limited progress owing to strong resistance and an extensive use of land mines and suicide attacks. The situation there was also complicated by the presence of civilians.

16. In June, fighting flared up in Ajdabiya between the Libyan National Army forces and the Benghazi Defence Brigades, which were founded on 1 June by fighters and armed groups who sought to distance themselves from the terrorist entities Ansar al-Sharia and ISIL. On 18 June, the Brigades attacked Libyan National Army forces guarding the Man-Made River Project south of Ajdabiya. On 20 July, it was reported that three French military officers were killed after the Brigades shot down a helicopter south of Benghazi.

17. In Darnah, Libyan National Army forces conducted airstrikes throughout the reporting period against the Darnah Mujahidin Shura Council, a coalition of local Islamist armed groups. Since the expulsion of ISIL from the city by the Shura Council, Libyan National Army forces intensified their siege on Darnah, limiting transport to and from the city, which was reported to suffer from intermittent shortages of food, medicine, gasoline and cash.

18. On 28 July, the Presidency Council and the leadership of the Petroleum Facilities Guard, commanded by Ibrahim Jadran, signed an agreement to reopen the oil load ports under Guard control in Ra's Lanuf and Sidrah. On 11 September, Libyan National Army forces attacked the Guard in the oil crescent area and quickly seized control of oil ports in Sidrah, Ra's Lanuf, Burayqah and Zuwaytinah with the support of tribal leaders. The confrontation reportedly resulted in one member of the Guard being killed and several injured. The Libyan National Army called on the National Oil Corporation to assume the management of the facilities, and on 15 September, National Oil Corporation chairman Mustafa Sanalla visited the oil crescent area. On 18 September, the Guard attacked Libyan National Army forces in Sidrah and Ra's Lanuf in an effort to retake control of the area, but they were repelled with the support of airstrikes. In a separate development, on 19 September, Libyan National Army forces expanded the area under their control through the seizure of the towns of Bin Jawwad and Harawah.

19. During the reporting period, General Abdul Razak al-Naduri, the military governor of the area between Bin Jawwad and Darnah, removed the elected mayors of the municipalities of Abyar, Ajdabiya, Benghazi, Kufrah, Shahhat and Sidrah. The mayors were replaced by military officers in four of the areas.

Situation in the south

20. In Sabha, there were continued instances of kidnapping and killing among tribal communities, causing at least 18 fatalities. The fear of a spillover of the military escalation in the east and of possible confrontation in the south between Libyan National Army forces and the Third Force, predominantly composed of fighters from Misratah, continued to have an impact on the overall security situation.

21. The Libyan National Army attempted to expand its influence in the south, and military elements affiliated with the former regime tried to reorganize. Tensions

increased in Sabha on 9 October, when a force affiliated with the Libyan National Army entered the city. In Kufrah, there were continued tensions between members of the Tebu community and armed elements from Zway.

ISIL presence

22. In Sirte, ISIL suffered a major defeat at the hand of forces loyal to the Presidency Council, losing almost all of the 300 kilometres of territory that it had controlled in the area. The forces participated in Operation Bunyan Marsus (Solid Wall), backed by airstrikes by the United States of America, and successfully rolled back ISIL gains over a period of six months, which resulted in more than 650 fighters being killed and more than 2,000 injured. At the end of the reporting period, the ISIL presence in Sirte was limited to a small pocket in the city centre. The number of ISIL fatalities is unknown.

23. In a first phase that lasted from early May to mid-June, Operation Bunyan Marsus forces pushed ISIL back eastwards to the outskirts of Sirte and took control once more of the areas of Abu Qurayn, Abu Najm and Washkah. The Operation comprised mostly fighters from Misratah and smaller contingents from other cities, including Jufrah, Sabha and Tripoli. Simultaneously, Petroleum Facilities Guard forces and other local units advanced from the east and pushed ISIL out of the towns of Bin Jawwad, Nawfaliyah and Harawah.

24. In a second phase, Operation Bunyan Marsus forces gradually gained control of the main neighbourhoods of Sirte and captured strategic infrastructure from ISIL, including the Qardabiyah airbase, the Ouagadougou conference complex, Sirte University and the port. At the request of the Presidency Council, on 2 August, the United States of America commenced Operation Odyssey Lightning, a series of airstrikes against ISIL targets in Sirte.

25. Sirte was the last significant population centre under ISIL control in Libya, and the ISIL presence is now limited to small pockets in Sirte and Benghazi. Smaller groups and cells remain active throughout the country. UNSMIL is working with Sirte Stabilization Committee, appointed by the Presidency Council, and international partners to coordinate planning for a comprehensive reconstruction plan for the city of Sirte.

Economic situation

26. There was a marked increase in the production of oil following the reopening of oil facilities in the oil crescent. On 15 September, National Oil Corporation Chairman Mustafa Sanalla stated that national exports would increase from 200,000 to 900,000 barrels per day by the end of the year. On 15 September, Chairman Sanalla lifted the *force majeure* clause, which had blocked oil exports from the oil crescent region, and a number of tankers resumed exporting oil. Following discussions with members of the Presidency Council, Chairman Sanalla confirmed that the Corporation had received 300 million dinars and the Presidency Council was committed to providing an additional 300 million dinars to invest in repairs and maintenance for national oil infrastructure. By mid-October, production had increased to 570,000 barrels per day.

27. With low oil revenues, the 2016 fiscal deficit is expected to reach 69 per cent of gross domestic product. With the dinar continuing to lose value, the Central Bank of Libya estimated inflation at 25 per cent in the year ending June 2016. While the increase in oil production provides foreign currency earnings for the Central Bank of Libya and has slowed the depletion of national reserves, the economic situation has not improved. All across the country, banks are running short of cash. The issue of the Bank releasing funds to enable the delivery of basic services was one element of discussion at the meeting in support of Libya's economy held on 31 October and 1 November in London.

28. On 15 August, the Chairman of the Libyan Investment Authority resigned, and the Presidency Council appointed an interim steering committee to manage litigation on behalf of the Authority but not to dispose of or transfer assets. In September, the Authority won two significant cases against foreign investment management firms, which together lead to the recovery of more than $120 million. However, on 14 October, the Authority lost a case against a United States investment bank regarding a failed investment of $1.2 billion.

III. Constitution drafting process

29. There continued to be deep differences in view over the substance of the draft constitution produced by members of the Constitution Drafting Assembly, who met in Salalah, Oman, earlier in the year and voted on the draft in April at a subsequent meeting in Bayda. Members who did not attend the Salalah meeting continued to highlight differences over issues relating to the internal procedures and the substance of the draft constitution, including representation, the rights of minorities, the role and composition of the Senate and the presidency.

30. During the reporting period, members of the Constitution Drafting Assembly who did not attend the Salalah retreat initiated a case challenging the legality of the changes to the by-laws of the Assembly before the administrative court in Bayda'. The case questions the legality of the vote taken by those who signed the draft constitution on 19 April.

IV. Other activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

A. Electoral support

31. During the reporting period, the United Nations electoral support team continued to provide capacity-building and technical assistance to the High National Elections Commission with a view to preparing for future elections. United Nations support included the organization and implementation of a series of workshops, trainings, exchange visits and capacity development programmes for the Commission and relevant stakeholders. The goal of these activities was to address technical topics, build networks and facilitate exchanges with counterparts in Libya and the wider Arab region.

32. The United Nations electoral support team helped the High National Elections Commission to finalize a comprehensive gender-mapping document, entitled "Electoral gender mapping: women's participation in Libya's national elections, 2012-2014" to assist decision-makers in addressing barriers and minimizing factors that discourage women's participation in elections.

B. Human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law

33. During the reporting period, violations of international human rights and humanitarian law continued to be perpetrated by all groups, mostly with impunity. Violations included: abductions, hostage-taking, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture, unlawful killings and attacks on civilians.

34. Civilians were caught in the crossfire in the course of ongoing conflict across the country. From 17 May to 12 October, UNSMIL documented a total of 246 civilian casualties, including 94 deaths and 132 injuries. Airstrikes caused the most deaths and injuries, with shelling causing the second-highest number of casualties. The highest number of civilian deaths was recorded in Benghazi.

35. UNSMIL documented six attacks on medical facilities, including the shelling of the Benghazi Medical Centre in May and June, and a car bomb attack on the Jala' hospital in Benghazi on 24 June, which killed five people and injured 13, including two children. On 19 September, an unidentified armed group stormed the intensive care unit of the Zawiyah Teaching Hospital.

36. Civilians remain trapped in the Qanfoudha neighbourhood of Benghazi, facing bombings and shortages of food, water and medical care. Those trapped included migrant workers and former prisoners from the Bu Hudaymah military prison in Benghazi. Despite intensive local mediation efforts supported by UNSMIL, the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and the Libyan National Army did not reach an agreement on the modalities for the evacuation of civilians.

Abductions and killings

37. Armed groups from all sides continued to abduct and kill civilians. Individuals were targeted for their political opinions, affiliations, family or tribal identity. Armed groups also commonly abducted people for ransom or prisoner exchange.

38. On 21 July, the bodies of 14 people were found in a rubbish dump in the Laythi neighbourhood of Benghazi. The military prosecutor in Benghazi reportedly opened an investigation into the killings, but has not made public any findings. There were also attacks against justice sector and other officials. On 22 July, an unidentified armed group abducted Mohammad Faraj Abou-Amid, the chairman of the north Tripoli court. On 25 July, unidentified gunmen abducted two officials from the civil registry office in Muzurq, and their bodies were found shortly afterwards in Sabha. Important religious figures and members of civil society have also been kidnapped for financial or political reasons. On 6 October, Sheikh Nader al-Omrani, a prominent member of Dar al-Ifta', was kidnapped by unknown assailants in Tripoli. On 19 October, the former chairman of Libyan airlines was also kidnapped. A total of 4 people were killed and 18 injured in an explosion in Kish Square in

Benghazi on 29 October. One of the civilians killed was Muhammad Bugaighis, an anti-corruption activist.

Detention, torture and deaths in custody

39. Arbitrary detention continued to be a widespread problem in both official detention centres and detention facilities run by armed groups in all regions of the country. Little progress had been made to review individual cases to ensure that those being held are either prosecuted or released, in accordance with Libyan law.

40. UNSMIL recorded cases of arbitrary detention and torture across the country, including in the Garnadah and Kuwayfiah prisons in Benghazi, the Jawiya and Taminah prisons in Misratah and the Abu Salim, Fursan Janzur, Hadbah and Mitiga prisons in Tripoli. Previous allegations of torture and ill-treatment in the Hadhba prison, including video evidence, which became public in 2015, have not yet resulted in prosecutions. Dire conditions were observed in the Mitiga and Sabha prisons. Allegations described a pattern of severe torture and ill-treatment. The information received indicated that at least three deaths in custody from torture occurred in the Mitiga prison during the reporting period. On 9 June, following the issuing of release orders by the Office of the General Prosecutor for 19 prisoners from the Ruwaymi prison, the bodies of 12 of the prisoners were found in different locations in Tripoli bearing gunshot wounds. All the deceased were former Qadhafi regime members and the circumstances surrounding the killings remained unclear. The Office of the General Prosecutor stated that it had opened an investigation, but it had not announced any findings as at the time of publication of the present report. On 27 October, 10 bodies were found with their hands tied and gunshot wounds in a rubbish dump in the Shabnah neighbourhood of Benghazi, which is under the control of the Libyan National Army forces.

Groups in vulnerable situations

41. Migrants were detained arbitrarily in detention centres run by the Department for Combating Illegal Migration, and in other forms of informal detention under the control of armed groups and criminal smuggling and trafficking networks. Migrants detained in centres operated by the Department did not go through any legal process, and there was no oversight by judicial authorities. Conditions in the centres were inhuman, with people held in warehouses in appalling sanitary conditions, with poor ventilation and extremely limited access to light and water. In some detention centres, migrants suffered from severe malnutrition, and UNSMIL received numerous and consistent reports of torture, including beatings and sexual violence, as well as forced labour by armed groups with access to the centres.

42. Children were victims of abductions and arbitrary detention, often held in facilities without being separated from adults. Civilian casualties included children, with at least 24 killed in hostilities during the reporting period, including in playgrounds and recreational parks. Women were also arbitrarily held in detention, often because of personal affiliations. Journalists, other media professionals and bloggers were also the victims of targeted attacks, facing unlawful killings, abductions and arbitrary detention. Three journalists were reportedly killed by snipers, and other media workers were injured, including in Sirte. One Libyan

journalist was killed by a sniper in Benghazi, while two other journalists, a Libyan and a Dutch national, were killed by ISIL snipers in Sirte.

Transitional justice and reconciliation

43. UNSMIL supported the Misratah/Tawurgha' dialogue committee, which met four times during the reporting period in implementation of the 18 December 2015 road map document. On 31 August, the two sides signed an agreement that included provisions for reparations for the victims of the 2011 conflict and the return of internally displaced persons back to Tawurgha'. The agreement seeks the endorsement of the Misratah Municipal Council and the Tawurgha' local council, as well as the Government of National Accord. UNSMIL has encouraged both parties and the Government to ensure the implementation of both the right to reparations and the right to return without conditions.

44. At the local level, reconciliation efforts progressed in the Nafusah Mountains and between the Tawurgha' and Misratahn communities. UNSMIL organized a national reconciliation workshop from 31 August to 2 September to map and evaluate existing national and local reconciliation initiatives. The workshop brought together 75 Libyan activists, experts, politicians and associations to discuss the challenges and opportunities for national reconciliation in Libya. Consultations between UNSMIL, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Peacebuilding Support Office are ongoing to support the development of a national reconciliation strategy by Libyan stakeholders.

Judicial and penal system

45. In an effort to preserve the unity of the judicial bodies from political interference, on 4 September, the President of the Supreme Judicial Council, Judge Muhammd al-Hafi, and the Prosecutor General ad interim, Judge Ibrahim Mas'ud, accompanied by other members of the Council, travelled to Tubruq to meet with members of the judicial bodies in the east. The meeting resulted in the adoption of decisions by the Council related to promotions and transfer of members of the judicial bodies for the judicial year 2016-2017. The delegation also held working meetings with members of the judicial bodies representing Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Darnah, Bayda and Marj. UNSMIL continued to meet with representatives and interlocutors of the judicial and correction system to discuss the situation of detainees, the investigation of human rights violations and plans for technical support to judges and prosecutors.

46. In order to provide support in the transfer of detainees to detention centres under the full control of the judicial police under the Ministry of Justice, as stipulated in the Libyan Political Agreement, UNSMIL conducted visits to five prisons in Tripoli, from 26 to 29 September. Only three detention centres in Tripoli were under the full control of the judicial police, while four others were run and secured by armed groups.

C. Security sector

Support for Libyan planning for interim security arrangements

47. UNSMIL continued to work closely with the Presidency Council and the Ministries of Interior and of Defence on the implementation of the interim security

arrangements outlined in the Libyan Political Agreement. Key areas of support included: assessments and planning for Tripoli security; the formation of a presidential guard and engagement with armed groups; and support to counter improvised explosive devices and clear explosive remnants of war. UNSMIL staff continue to visit Tripoli and other cities regularly to facilitate these and other related activities.

48. As a result of work by UNSMIL with the Temporary Security Committee, the Presidency Council issued decree No. 2 of 9 May 2016, establishing a presidential guard, to be composed of a mix of police and army personnel. However, the breadth and scope of the tasks given to the presidential guard were more ambitious than those originally proposed by the Temporary Security Committee and have caused some concern among a range of security actors. On 31 August, the Presidency Council appointed a presidential guard commander and two deputies. UNSMIL has worked closely with the presidential guard commander, encouraging him to focus on security for Tripoli. UNSMIL has also continued to engage with armed groups to widen the support for the Libyan Political Agreement and enabled closer coordination among security actors in Tripoli.

49. With the assistance of a European Union liaison and planning cell, UNSMIL continues to monitor police and army unit deployments, principally in Tripoli, to assess the security situation and the implementation of the interim security arrangements. UNSMIL also remains engaged on policing reform and security sector development.

Arms and ammunition management

50. There continues to be a significant risk of death and injury from explosive remnants of war and booby traps in Benghazi. To address the issue, the United Nations Mine Action Service arranged for training in Tunis of 30 non-technical survey personnel from the National Safety Authority, forensic police and military engineers, to enable areas of the city to be assessed for contamination with explosive hazards and to determine clearance priorities. Teams undertaking those tasks were also trained in emergency trauma response and provided with medical equipment in order to improve their safety. The teams are currently receiving tasking orders from the Libyan Mine Action Service for survey tasks in Benghazi.

D. Women's empowerment

51. UNSMIL continued to promote the role of women in the political process, in accordance with the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2122 (2013).

52. UNSMIL offered support and technical assistance to the Minister of Social Affairs, State Minister for Women's Affairs and Social Development and State Minister of Institutional Reform in the Government of National Accord. After the Presidency Council established the Women's Support and Empowerment Unit on 8 September, UNSMIL convened three meetings of the Women's Advocacy Group to support the drafting of an advocacy plan targeting the Presidency Council and the House of Representatives. The Unit demanded that 30 per cent of the seats in the newly proposed Government of National Accord be allotted to women.

53. On 4 and 30 October, based on a request for technical support from women members of the House of Representatives, UNSMIL visited the House of Representatives in Tubruq. The Mission subsequently convened a conference for women parliamentarians, including from neighbouring countries, in Tunis from 10 to 12 November.

54. In partnership with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women regional office for Arab States and with financial support from the Government of Switzerland, UNSMIL organized three training events in Tunis in May, June and August, on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and women's political participation, and on negotiation and conflict resolution. In partnership with UNDP, and with support from the Governments of Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, on 1 August UNSMIL launched a two-year project entitled "*Amal*", or "Hope", aimed at providing technical assistance to women in institutions emanating from the Libyan Political Agreement.

E. Youth

55. UNSMIL and the United Nations country team have intensified efforts to reach out to Libyan youth, who remain underrepresented in transitional institutions. The United Nations held two events in August in Tunis that brought together Libyan youth for exchanges on their role in resolving the current political impasse. Marking International Youth Day on 12 August, some 30 civil society organizations conducted activities in 11 municipalities across Libya with support from the United Nations Population Fund. In October, my Special Representative met with youth leaders engaged in training young people in dialogue and reconciliation in Tripoli.

F. Coordination of international assistance

56. The decision by the Presidency Council to delegate ministerial responsibilities to designated ministers and the active participation of the Ministry of Planning in the technical bodies of the joint Technical Coordination Committee, provided renewed impetus for United Nations coordination assistance. On 28 and 29 September, UNSMIL, in partnership with UNDP, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, convened the fourth Libyan Experts Development Cooperation Forum in Tunis. Recently registered as a non-governmental organization in Libya and seeking to promote synergy between the Libyan intellectual community and government decision makers, the Forum analysed policy options, actions and priorities to be proposed to the Government of National Accord. The joint Technical Coordination Committee, which met regularly with national representatives during the reporting period, convened on 12 October in Tripoli, in one of the first multilateral meetings with extended international presence to take place in the Libyan capital since mid-2014.

57. The Stabilization Facility for Libya project, launched by UNDP in April 2016 with support from UNSMIL and the international community, received $30 million in pledges from Member States, and the Government of National Accord pledged to match that amount. On the basis of a careful review of selection criteria, the Board of the Stabilization Facility agreed to support Benghazi in eastern Libya, Kiklah in

western Libya and Sabha and Awbari in southern Libya. Assistance packages included the provision of essential equipment for hospitals and clinics, schools, emergency services and waste and wastewater management, and the rehabilitation of small-scale infrastructure damaged during the fighting. The delivery of assistance began in early October.

G. Humanitarian assistance

58. The Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016, launched in November 2015, had received only 30 per cent of the required funding, totalling $51.7 million, as at 31 October. The inadequate funding limited the ability of the United Nations and its partners to provide life-saving assistance to the most vulnerable of the 1.3 million targeted beneficiaries. In preparation for the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2017, the humanitarian country team conducted a humanitarian needs overview and convened a workshop in Tunis on 10 and 11 October for representatives from national and local authorities and the international community, to identify needs, the most vulnerable groups and priority responses for 2017. In September 2016, the humanitarian country team issued a flash appeal requesting $10.7 million for urgent life-saving assistance to 79,400 internally displaced persons expected to return to Sirte. Although over 53,000 internally displaced persons returned since September, the Flash Appeal had received no funding as of the date of drafting of the present report.

59. Figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) displacement tracking mechanism indicate that the number of internally displaced persons in Libya was 313,236 in October, a reduction from previous months. In Benghazi in particular, returns brought down the number of internally displaced persons from 115,000 in June to 51,730 in September.

60. Despite the funding shortfalls, United Nations agencies continued to provide urgent humanitarian relief and assistance during the reporting period, largely through national responders and government counterparts. The World Health Organization (WHO) provided life-saving kits, medicines and supplies, including basic and supplementary emergency health kits, emergency trauma kits, medicines for non-communicable disease and other kits to various locations, in sufficient quantities to provide life-saving interventions for a target population of 60,000 for a period of three months. WHO also continued to support capacity-building for national institutions, including by offering trainings on mental health, assessing health needs and providing supplies and services such as activities for immunizations against polio. WHO conducted a national assessment of 98 hospitals between May and October and found that only four hospitals were operating above 75 per cent functionality, while 27 were operating below 25 per cent functionality and 16 were closed due to conflict-related damage. In order to ensure the operation of critical medical installations and equipment amid frequent power cuts, UNDP provided nine hospitals in Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha with solar panels.

61. The World Food Programme provided food assistance to 113,485 people in need, primarily internally displaced persons and refugees. The challenges of increased fighting, lack of cash liquidity and the depreciation of the dinar against major currencies has severely affected food security in Libya and the population's livelihoods throughout 2016.

62. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) supported psychosocial assistance programmes for 2,537 children and specialized child protection services for 656 children. UNICEF implementing partners provided hygiene kits to 12,846 internally displaced persons, including 5,138 children, in different parts of the country. In Benghazi and other conflict-affected areas, 8,942 school-aged children benefitted from safe learning spaces. In June, also in Benghazi, UNICEF, in partnership with national non-governmental organizations, offered catch-up classes to 5,201 school-aged children, including 179 from Sirte, to enable them to return to formal education. UNICEF provided 5,641 residents of a camp for internally displaced persons in Tripoli with water tanks and water treatment chemicals, and 1,500 families in Zintan and 1,300 displaced families in Sirte received hygiene kits. The municipal council of Sabrathah committed to supporting the protection of vulnerable children affected by armed conflict, including the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups.

63. Between 17 May and 21 October, IOM recorded 114,152 refugees and migrants who had reached Italy by boat from the African shores, mostly from Libya. Over 14,000 migrants were rescued in 2016 by the Libyan Coast Guard, and 3,156 deaths were recorded in the central Mediterranean Sea corridor. Of the 256,690 migrants identified by IOM in Libya, 3,624 were held in detention centres managed by the Department for Combating Illegal Migration. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has registered a total number of 37,744 refugees and asylum seekers, most of whom were Syrian.

64. Since May, IOM facilitated the safe return of 2,016 migrants in Libya to nine different countries of origin, and provided reintegration assistance to 162 of the most vulnerable returnees. IOM also distributed non-food items, hygiene kits and basic commodities to 17,782 internally displaced persons and 21,474 migrants, in addition to immediate humanitarian assistance to hundreds of migrants rescued at sea by the Libyan coast guard. In coordination with the coast guard and the Libyan port security, IOM installed three furnished and equipped medical clinics at main disembarkation points in Tripoli, Qasr al-Qarahbulli and Zlitan. UNHCR provided primary health care in three community development centres in Tripoli and Benghazi, in detention centres and in five major disembarkation points.

65. Assistance by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to the Libyan Department of Antiquities and cultural institutions in Libya culminated with the approval of a new priority action plan to address emergency and short-term interventions. The plan was aimed at safeguarding the country's cultural heritage and was approved by more than 80 participants from Libya and the international community in a meeting held in Tunis, from 9 to 11 May.

V. Deployment of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and security arrangements

66. The original total resources approved for UNSMIL for 2016 amounted to $41,181,500, with a staffing table including 195 posts and two United Nations Volunteer positions. In view of the security conditions in Libya, UNSMIL international staff remained deployed in Tunis, where the Mission is temporarily headquartered. As at 30 September, a total of 136 UNSMIL international staff, one

national staff member, four government-provided personnel and two United Nations Volunteers were deployed in Tunis, with an additional 28 national staff in Libya. Furthermore, three international staff members and one General Service staff member were deployed at United Nations headquarters, and three national staff at the Global Service Centre in Brindisi.

67. As set out in resolutions 2238 (2015), 2273 (2016) and 2291 (2016), UNSMIL has worked towards the phased re-establishment of a permanent presence in Libya and, to this end, the establishment of the necessary security arrangements. With the establishment of regular flights from Tunis to Libya on 30 March, UNSMIL staff have been able maintain access to key partners in particular political and security interlocutors, inside the country, bolstering popular support for the Government of National Accord and assisting with the stabilization of security conditions. Regular flights have also facilitated the implementation of other core mandate areas, enabling visits to detention centres, meetings with judicial authorities, engagement in transitional justice activities, discussions with women's groups and advocates and increased access to Libya for the United Nations country team, with a view to enhancing assistance on humanitarian priorities.

68. In line with the findings of the needs assessment mission referred to in my previous report (S/2016/452), UNSMIL has successfully identified a compound in Tripoli to serve as its premises. Likewise, UNSMIL liaised closely with its partners at Headquarters as they identified a troop-contributing country to provide a United Nations Guard Unit in Tripoli. From 25 June to 3 July, the selected troop-contributing country deployed a team to UNSMIL to undertake an initial assessment of security requirements and associated needs, to permit a rapid deployment to Tripoli. Subsequently, an advance team joined the Mission from 30 September to 30 October, working closely with the Office of Mission Support and security staff from UNSMIL and the Department of Safety and Security, to plan for its deployment to the Libyan capital.

69. Additionally, UNSMIL, supported closely by Headquarters, continued to work on the full spectrum of security measures, including the establishment of arrangements for in extremis support in the case of an emergency evacuation of personnel out of Libya. With respect to humanitarian assistance, United Nations humanitarian team partners have reviewed their operational plans, with the aim of increasing programming for target populations.

Security and safety of staff members and operations

70. United Nations personnel in Libya continued to work in a high-risk security environment and implement programmes and activities based on programme criticality. The United Nations vulnerability and risk exposure while implementing its programmes remained high, necessitating continued mainstreaming of additional security resources in its programmes. State institutions have limited capacity to provide security, given the incidence of armed confrontation, terrorism and violent crime throughout the country. Since the arrival of the Presidency Council in Tripoli in March, the Mission has increased operations in Libya and worked to establish a permanent presence of security staff in the capital on a rotational basis. In two incidents in June and September, the Diplomatic Police were hindered by armed groups while escorting UNSMIL convoys in Tripoli. Demonstrations against the

United Nations in the capital and in major eastern cities remained largely peaceful, but the potential for violence remained. Operation Bunyan Marsus disrupted the ISIL presence in Sirte. However, ISIL elements may have dispersed to other parts of the country, posing a risk to operations and the United Nations presence in Tripoli. ISIL claimed responsibility for vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks near government offices in Tripoli on 8 September. However, the claims lacked credibility. Three foreign nationals were abducted in Ghat in September and were subsequently released.

VI. Observations and recommendations

71. More than five years since the revolution of 17 February and one year after the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement in Skhirat, the Libyan people continue to strive to move their country forward on the path of a democratic transition. I had the opportunity to visit Libya in 2011 and 2014 and witnessed first-hand the rising aspirations of the youth, women and men of Libya for a stable, democratic, prosperous and peaceful country. I am encouraged to see that their determination and commitment remains strong amidst the many political, security and economic challenges facing the country.

72. The Libyan Political Agreement remains an important milestone in the path to the country's democratic transition. By creating a framework to unify Libyan institutions and form a Government of National Accord, the Agreement represents a unique opportunity for all Libyans to resolve their differences and lay the foundations for inclusive and democratic governance. I wish to commend the many political and civil society actors participating in the Libyan political dialogue for their commitment to support the implementation of the Agreement and its institutions and for their courage in transcending their differences in the interest of peace. That same determination to work for a resumption of the country's democratic transition must continue to drive all Libyans.

73. However, I am deeply concerned at the slow pace of implementation of the Agreement and the serious political polarization leading to a deterioration of the security, economic and humanitarian situation. The Libyan Political Agreement and its institutions will only be successful, as a transitional framework, if they lead, with the support of all Libyans and within a reasonable time frame, to the adoption of a new Constitution and the establishment of democratically elected institutions. Should these efforts fail, it may be necessary to review the international community's approach to the Libyan democratic transition process.

74. The window of opportunity that the Libyan Political Agreement has created is closing rapidly. For the country to forge a path forward, Libyan actors must pursue national reconciliation in earnest. To that end, I encourage the Libyan people to commit to a nation-wide reconciliation process that broadens and reinforces the political settlement that has already been reached. I also encourage the Libyan authorities to complement and strengthen reconciliation efforts undertaken by communities at the local level. I commend the many local reconciliation initiatives that have already been initiated, and I encourage the parties to make full use of the good offices of the United Nations to advance local and national reconciliation agreements in the months ahead.

75. I urge all Libyan stakeholders, especially those who are currently not fully engaged in the process, to work together with the Presidency Council to resolve outstanding issues and focus their efforts on rebuilding the country. Institutions emanating from the Libyan Political Agreement should urgently assume their functions in accordance with the Agreement and commit themselves to cooperating in the management of the remainder of the transitional period. I call in particular on the leaders of opposing constituencies to put the interests of their country first and participate in the country's political transition through dialogue within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement. I urge the House of Representatives to amend the Constitutional Declaration as a matter of priority, in order to constitutionalize the institutions emanating from the Libyan Political Agreement, and to vote on a Government of National Accord. I also encourage the State Council to exercise its functions as the highest consultative Assembly of the State in an inclusive and responsible manner. Moreover, the Constitution Drafting Assembly must resume its work to finalize the constitutional process that will pave the way for a referendum and eventually new elections, as set out in the Libyan Political Agreement.

76. I further encourage the members of the Presidency Council to overcome their differences and to work as a cohesive and unified body to address the critical needs of the population, supported by effective and transparent financial arrangements. Coordination between the Presidency Council and the Government of National Accord on one hand and the Central Bank of Libya is essential to enable the Government of National Accord to deliver services. In this regard, I urge the parties to engage constructively to address short-term issues related to funding and liquidity and longer-term structural issues.

77. Deepening polarization has also prevented progress on the establishment of security arrangements. As a result, there have been repeated outbreaks of violence among the various factions and a worrying rise in criminality. Libyan citizens are suffering the consequences of increasing lawlessness, kidnappings, theft and the degradation of basic services. I am very concerned about the recent military build-up in the country. I urge security actors to exercise restraint and adhere to international humanitarian law. I remind them that there is no military solution to the Libyan crisis. I also call on them to commit to dialogue and to work constructively in the higher interest of the Libyan people to support the creation of professional, inclusive, effective and accountable Libyan armed and police forces, under full civilian control and oversight. In this regard, I welcome the establishment of the presidential guard by the Presidency Council as a key first step in a longer-term process of creating professional and accountable security institutions.

78. I commend Libyan women for actively engaging in peacebuilding initiatives and the Presidency Council for appointing a chairperson for the Women's Support and Empowerment Unit. I encourage all Libyans to continue to strive for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, and I call on the Presidency Council to ensure that women are adequately represented in the Government of National Accord.

79. I am encouraged by the progress that has been made in the fight against terrorist and violent extremist groups, in particular ISIL in Sirte and Benghazi. Military successes against ISIL are crucial to eliminating the grave threat that these groups represent. I express my sympathies to the victims of terrorism and for the

loss of so many lives in this fight. The remaining presence of ISIL in Libya should serve as an urgent reminder of the need for heightened vigilance and the swift development of unified security structures across the country. I urge Libyans to unite and join forces across the political and security divide in their fight against ISIL in service to their country and under unified command.

80. I remain deeply alarmed by the human rights situation in the country, especially as it relates to enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture, unlawful killings and attacks on civilians. I condemn the targeting of civilian facilities, in particular hospitals and medical centres. I urge all parties to the conflict and those with influence on the ground to respect international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

81. Hundreds of thousands of innocent migrants and refugees from across the African continent and beyond have left the coast of Libya in search of a better future, escaping conflict, poverty and persecution. Many have lost their lives in this journey of hope, while others have been detained in inhuman conditions and often mistreated or abused. Ongoing efforts to respond to the migration crisis are commendable but not sufficient. I call on all international partners to redouble their humanitarian assistance and to increase the capacity of the Libyan authorities to manage migration flows with full respect for human rights and dignity.

82. I also note with alarm the overall deterioration of the humanitarian situation as a result of continued armed confrontations in various parts of the country. Hundreds of thousands of Libyans, including those who have been repeatedly displaced, continue to suffer from the appalling consequences of the humanitarian crisis. They lack public services and basic amenities, including adequate access to safe drinking water, hygiene and sanitation services. I call on the Libyan authorities to take immediate action and address the worrying issues highlighted in the comprehensive national assessment of hospitals, primary health-care centres and disease-specific programmes.

83. I am particularly concerned by the widespread contamination with explosive hazards, including improvised explosive devices, in the areas of Sirte and Benghazi, where the risk of injury and death to civilians and to humanitarian actors is high. There is limited national capacity to address this threat, and the teams carrying out these tasks do so at significant personal risk. I urge Member States to fund clearance activities in the most severely affected areas and to provide training and equipment to the Libyan actors undertaking survey and clearance tasks. I also call on the Presidency Council and Member States to provide resources on an urgent basis to the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016, which remains underfunded, so that relief can be brought to those in critical need of protection and humanitarian assistance.

84. As 2017 approaches, the key operational priority of UNSMIL will remain the phased redeployment to Tripoli, including the deployment of a United Nations Guard Unit. To this effect, UNSMIL will continue to assess the political situation and the achievement of security conditions and benchmarks. Re-establishing a United Nations presence in the Libyan capital will enable consistent access to key stakeholders and Libyan institutions. Such a presence will also enhance access to other cities and areas of the country, in both the east and the south. To facilitate this process, the Secretariat will conduct a strategic assessment review in early 2017 to

align the re-establishment of a United Nations presence in Libya with the political, security and operational realities on the ground.

85. To that end, I recommend that the Security Council renew the mandate of UNSMIL for a period of one year as an integrated special political mission in the areas provided by the Council in its resolutions 2238 (2015), 2259 (2015), 2273 (2016) and 2291 (2016). UNSMIL will continue to support the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement and its institutions. UNSMIL will also continue to provide good offices and support in the implementation of security arrangements and the constitution-drafting process. In this framework, the United Nations system will continue to work with key Libyan institutions and coordinate support with international partners to address the critical capacity and institutional gaps the country faces.

86. I would like to express my appreciation to the African Union, the European Union, the League of Arab States and Member States for their significant support to the United Nations in Libya. I am particularly encouraged by the commitment and support of regional actors and organizations, including the neighbours of Libya, to the Libyan political process. Finally, I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the dedication and hard work of the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations system in their efforts to support the transition in Libya, and I commend my Special Representative, Martin Kobler, for his leadership and tireless efforts to support the Libyans in driving forward the political process and implementing the Libyan Political Agreement.

87. As I end my tenure at the United Nations, I urge all Libyan stakeholders to transcend their political differences and work together constructively to meet the expectations of the population. I also urge Member States to continue to work on a unified and coordinated approach, in support of the political process and the capacity needs of the country.

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United Nations S/2016/1012*

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 December 2016

Original: English

Identical letters dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instruction from my Government, I would like to draw your attention to the following information.

On 27 November 2016, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Qatari regime, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, stated in an interview with Reuters, in his office in Doha, that: "Qatar will continue to arm Syrian rebels even if Donald Trump ends U.S. backing for the multinational effort." He also stated in the same interview that: "This support is going to continue, we are not going to stop it. It doesn't mean that if Aleppo falls we will give up … Even if the regime captures it [Aleppo], I am sure they [the rebels] will have the ability to capture it back from the regime ... We need more military support."

It is well known that the royal family in Qatar is the foremost supporter of the "Nusrah Front" terrorist group in Syria. In this regard, I would like to refer to a statement made on 12 May 2015, by the current Minister of State for Defence of the Qatari regime, Khalid bin Mohammad al-Atiyah, when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an interview with the French newspaper *Le Monde*. In his answer to a question about his Government's position towards "Nusrah front" and whether it considered it a terrorist group, Mr. Al-Atiyah stated: "We are clearly against any kind of extremism. However, with the exception of Da'esh, all of those groups fight to overthrow the regime. Moderates cannot say to Nusrah Front: 'stay home, because we do not want to work with you.' Field conditions must be taken into consideration and we should be realistic."

The official statements made by both the current and former Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Qatari regime constitute public confessions of the Qatari regime's involvement in supporting terrorists in Syria and providing terrorist groups with weapons and finance, in particular the "Nusrah Front" terrorist organization, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in a challenge to the will of the international community to combat terrorism and in contravention of the Council's unanimous designation of "Nusrah Front" as a terrorist entity.

* Reissued for technical reasons on 12 December 2016.

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According to paragraphs 3 to 8 of Security Council resolution 2253 (2015), adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it befalls on the Security Council and its Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities to immediately act and take the measures appropriate and necessary for holding these individuals and the Government that they represent fully accountable for supporting terrorism, challenging the international community, violating the Council's resolutions and threatening international peace and security.

Resolution 2253 (2015) and other relevant resolutions have been decisive and clear in deciding that sanctions should be imposed on individuals and entities linked to ISIL (Da'esh) and "Nusrah Front". On that basis, I request that you take the measures necessary for applying resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) against those who support "Nusrah Front" in Syria, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Qatari regime, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, the Minister of State for Defence of the Qatari regime, Khalid bin Mohammad al-Atiyah, and the Qatari regime, as individuals and an entity in association with the "Nusrah Front" terrorist group.

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2016/1013

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 December 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward to you the concept note for the high-level open debate of the Security Council on the theme "Preventing catastrophe: a global agenda for stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors", which will be held on 15 December 2016 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Román **Oyarzun**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note on the high-level open debate of the Security Council on the theme "Preventing catastrophe: a global agenda for stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors", to be held on 15 December 2016

I. Introduction

Spain will convene a high-level open debate of the Security Council on 15 December 2016 on how to reinforce the preventive system to avoid the humanitarian, political and economic catastrophe that the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by non-State actors, particularly terrorists, would entail. The topic falls under the agenda item entitled "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". The open debate will take into account the conclusions of the report of the comprehensive review of Council resolution 1540 (2004), to be sent to the Council by the end of November 2016,[1] which will serve as the basis for a global agenda to achieve the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by 2021, when the current institutional arrangements adopted by the Council will expire. The meeting will be chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Spain, Alfonso Dastis.

II. Threat of weapons of mass destruction and non-State actors

The risk of non-State actors, particularly terrorists, using weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, is the biggest threat to global security. It is difficult to assess the likelihood of this threat because a large-scale attack has not happened yet. However, it does not mean that it will not happen, as terrorists have shown the intent and capability to develop weapons of mass destruction and to use them. In the nuclear field, we know that there are 2,000 metric tons of usable nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium) that, if not adequately protected, could fall into the wrong hands and be used by non-State actors to create havoc. The reports by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism have provided confirmation that toxic chemicals have been used as a weapon in Syria by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and there are new allegations that terrorists continue to or are trying to use them. OPCW has also confirmed that ISIL has used chemical weapons in Iraq and has developed a programme to make improvised chemical weapons. In the biological field, the threat is just as

[1] In its resolution 1977 (2011), the Security Council, noting that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States is a long-term task that will require continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels, mandated the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to conduct a comprehensive review on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including, if necessary, recommendations on adjustments to the mandate, before December 2016.

challenging: infectious biological agents are present in nature and have a broad spectrum (humans, animals and plants). Many of them are readily accessible and do not require sophisticated scientific knowledge to handle, while the cost of their development and use is low. The extent of their harm can be considerable, as they can have lethal and incapacitating effects on living organisms that might be the target of a biological attack. Such an attack not only would have devastating effects on humans, animals or plants, but could also produce major economic losses and have a wider humanitarian and social impact.

Furthermore, a specialized resource such as the Incident and Trafficking Database of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicates a "continuing nuclear security concern". The International Criminal Police Organization and the Nuclear Threat Initiative show that there has been a steady increase in nuclear and chemical incidents and, albeit more sporadic, incidents in the biological field.

Another factor that carries risk lies with the extraordinary and rapid advances in science and technology. Such advances create not only huge benefits for mankind, but also the potential for misuse, for example, by using information technologies to illegally transfer sensitive technology or taking advantage of the loopholes in online payment systems to move funds through jurisdictions with less effective legal frameworks to finance illicit proliferation activities. On a different note, the developments in global commercial, logistical and economic transactions make it harder for States to put in place effective controls to prevent proliferation activities and to identify the origin of the illegal transactions. This enables terrorists to take advantage of transnational criminal networks to obtain access to weapons of mass destruction. The risks and challenges brought about by advances in science and technology, in the context of the so-called "fourth industrial revolution", develop at a quicker pace than the ability of Governments to respond. It is therefore necessary to take action as soon as possible.

III. Responses by the international community

Throughout 2016, different initiatives have been undertaken to tackle the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. Participants at the fourth meeting of the Nuclear Security Summit, which was held in Washington, D.C., in April 2016, addressed the issue of nuclear terrorism and made it harder for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials. The 2016 International Conference on Nuclear Security of IAEA, which will be held in Vienna from 5 to 9 December, will also contribute to reinforcing international efforts in this field, including those of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Partnership, and addressing future challenges and threats to security worldwide. In the chemical field, the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism of the OPCW Executive Council has been engaged in studying ways to combat and prevent chemical terrorism. The work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism has also demonstrated the importance of such entities, not only to ensure accountability for those responsible for the use of chemical weapons, but also as a deterrent. In the biological field, the Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological

(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, to be held in Geneva in November, will consider, among other things, the threats posed by non-State actors and the risks of misuse inherent in the life sciences and the need not to impede the potential benefits from them. Another initiative worth mentioning is the proposal for a convention on chemical and biological terrorism, similar to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

In the Security Council, the main initiative in this area has been the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), which was conducted during the past two years and which will result in a report to the Council. Resolution 1540 (2004) is certainly the main instrument in this regard, as it is the only legally binding instrument that covers all three weapons of mass destruction, with a focus on preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their means of delivery and related materials to non-State actors, especially terrorists.

IV. Findings of the comprehensive review of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, and the Security Council should intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States. The rapidly evolving and increasing risks of proliferation in relation to non-State actors arising from developments in terrorism and the potential for misuse arising from rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce, as well as the need to take into account these developments, is another key aspect highlighted during the review.

In the period under review, the number of legally binding measures adopted by States to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors has increased, especially those with regard to taking action to prohibit activities of non-State actors relating to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Although some progress has also been made in relation to accounting, securing and export control measures, it is clear that, for many States, significant efforts remain to be taken to address gaps in these areas. It is worth noting, in particular, that fewer measures have been adopted to secure the production, use, storage and transport of materials relating to chemical and biological weapons. At the regional level, there has also been differentiated progress on the measures adopted by States depending on their local circumstances, such as the level of their industrial infrastructure and economic situation.

The Security Council, through the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), has been able to maintain a regular dialogue with States, in particular through visits upon invitation, where, for instance, gaps in implementation were addressed and needs for assistance identified.

Since the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors is global, it is important that key players, such as States and international, regional and subregional organizations, are engaged in its prevention and response. In this regard, it is encouraging to see that a real network of competent officials is

developing through the designation of "1540 points of contact" by States and international organizations.

While good progress has been made in the adoption of measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, the rate and variability of this progress confirms that accomplishing the objective of the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a long-term task that requires continuous efforts at the national, regional and international levels. It will also require sustained and intensified support from the Security Council and direct interaction with States. Continuing support will also be required from other components of the United Nations and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations.

With regard to cooperation with international and regional organizations, an even closer engagement by the Security Council to coordinate activities is needed to avoid duplication and to focus on areas most in need of action. As is evident from requests for assistance made by States, many of them need help in building their capacity to implement their obligations effectively.

Important progress has been made by the Security Council, through the 1540 Committee, in adopting a regional approach to promote action to strengthen its capacity to respond to requests for which dedicated funding support is needed.

Every effort should be made to focus direct interactions with States where they are most needed and on subjects where implementation is generally weaker, such as the implementation of the obligations to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials (Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), para. 3), in particular the obligations in the chemical and biological areas.

The support structure for the 1540 Committee, in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness, could be strengthened, in particular in the light of its increased activities and the need to deliver better assistance to Member States.

V. Proposed issues for debate

The key objective of the high-level open debate is to reflect on the practical measures that the Security Council and the United Nations system, Members States, international organizations, relevant sectors of civil society and parliamentarians can adopt to prevent non-State actors, in particular terrorists, from accessing or using weapons of mass destruction. The open debate builds on the conclusions and recommendations of the process of the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004). Participants in the open debate are encouraged to take a practical and action-oriented approach, thus creating momentum for an improvement of the effectiveness of the preventive system in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They are also encouraged to announce specific commitments for implementing the main recommendations of the comprehensive review, including financial support for those with the capacity to do it, to push forward the global non-proliferation agenda and contribute directly to a safer world.

Issues for consideration include the following:

- The measures that Member States intend to adopt in the main areas highlighted by the comprehensive review, in particular with regard to implementation and assistance for capacity-building to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A reference to national reports and the adoption of voluntary national action plans in this field would be welcome;
- The announcement of assistance programmes and voluntary contributions that help to promote the global agenda for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
- On the basis of the conclusions and recommendations of the comprehensive review, participants are invited to highlight effective practices that could further the global agenda;
- The Security Council could reflect on ways to strengthen the preventive system to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, including by analysing how the non-proliferation architecture can be reinforced so that there is greater coordination among its components, how to enhance the work of its relevant Committees, notably the 1540 Committee, and how to carry out improved monitoring of the implementation of applicable obligations and analyses of proliferation risks;
- International, regional and subregional organizations, including the United Nations system and other relevant initiatives, could also announce the measures that they intend to take to put the global agenda in practice in order to prevent non-State actors from using weapons of mass destruction, as described in the comprehensive review. In particular, they could announce how they plan to share information and coordinate with Member States and the United Nations, how they can assist in the implementation of relevant policies and measures and how they will deliver assistance to where it is most needed;
- Discuss better ways to improve transparency and outreach as transparency is a key feature of the work of the Security Council in the twenty-first century. This brings more legitimacy to its actions and inspires more trust in the institution. If the global agenda described in the comprehensive review is to be implemented properly, notwithstanding the primary responsibility of States, it needs to be understood clearly by all relevant actors, such as international organizations and civil society, in particular industry and academia.

VI. Participation, briefs, procedural aspects and outcome

The high-level open debate will be chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain, Alfonso Dastis. The Secretary-General will brief the Security Council. On behalf of civil society, the President of the Stimson Center, Brian Finley, and the Chief Executive Officer of DHL, Frank Appel, who has been invited and is to be confirmed, will brief the Council. Under rule 39, it is expected that relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and initiatives will participate in the open debate. Participants are encouraged to deliver concise but strong and focused statements of no more than four minutes during the open

debate so that there can be an active dialogue on the global agenda to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, as described in the comprehensive review. Longer statements can be sent in advance to the following address: sc-1540-committee@un.org. They will be published on the web page of the 1540 Committee. An outcome of the comprehensive review is expected.

United Nations S/2016/1014

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 December 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 1 December 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a report of the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the status of implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya (see annex). The report covers the period from 20 October to 20 November 2016.

The report was prepared for transmission to the Security Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of decision EC-M-52/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of OPCW of 20 July 2016 and Security Council resolution 2298 (2016) of 22 July 2016.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Status of implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya", prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of decision EC-M-52/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), of 20 July 2016 and Security Council resolution 2298 (2016) of 22 July 2016, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). The report covers the period from 20 October 2016 to 20 November 2016 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-52/DEC.2 of 27 July 2016 and EC-M-53/DEC.1 of 26 August 2016.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Report by the Director General

Status of implementation of the plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining category 2 chemical weapons outside the territory of Libya

1. At its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") adopted a decision on the "Destruction of Libya's Remaining Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016) and requested the Director-General to assist Libya in developing a modified plan of destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. On 22 July 2016, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2298 (2016), welcoming and endorsing the decision by the Council and requesting the Director General, through the Secretary General, to report to the Security Council on a regular basis until the destruction is complete and verified.

2. At the conclusion of its Fifty-Second Meeting, the Council adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Libya's Remaining Category 2 Chemical Weapons" (EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016). In operative paragraph 17 of that decision, the Council requested the Director-General to report to the Council on a monthly basis on the implementation of the decision. This third monthly report covers the period from 20 October to 20 November 2016.

Progress in the elimination of Libyan chemical weapons by the State Party hosting destruction activities

3. Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltlasten mbH (GEKA mbH), the designated destruction facility at Munster, Germany, informed the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") of the continuation of destruction operations. As at 14 November 2016, GEKA mbH had destroyed 60.97 metric tonnes of tributylamine. This destruction was accomplished using the afterburner of the plasma arc system, and no problems were encountered.

4. On 2 November 2016, representatives of GEKA mbH informed the Secretariat that GEKA mbH began the destruction of Libya's 2-chloroethanol in Incineration Plant 1 ("Munster-1") on 31 October 2016.

5. GEKA mbH continues to finalise the construction of the neutralisation process system for the phosphorous trichloride and the thionyl chloride. The destruction of these two chemicals will not begin until 2017.

6. A team of Secretariat personnel will travel to Germany to conduct an inspection at GEKA mbH from 21 to 25 November 2016. Two observers from the Libyan National Authority will accompany the team. Observations from this visit will be included in the next monthly update.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to Libya

7. As previously reported, the Secretariat was informed that during decanting operations at the Ruwagha storage facility one container experienced an exothermic reaction, causing the material inside to polymerise. The OPCW Laboratory has completed an analysis of the sample received from Libya, which was taken from the tank in question. In addition to determining the composition of the sample, the Laboratory was requested to ascertain whether the contents of the tank could be regarded as destroyed, or if residual declared chemicals were still present in amounts that would require the waste to be further chemically treated, as well as if the tank contents presented a proliferation risk.

8. Using gas chromatography-mass spectrometry analysis, both PCl_3 and $POCl_3$ were detected in the sample, in the region of 5% by weight. As the remaining concentrations of PCl_3 and $POCl_3$ were found to be more than 0.1% by weight, the contents of the remaining tank cannot be considered as destroyed. The observations made during the analysis of the sample do, however, point towards potential means of destruction. The highly viscous mass found in the tank is dissolvable in water, and the chemicals requiring destruction (PCl_3 and $POCl_3$) will hydrolyse to harmless, non-scheduled chemicals.

9. Owing to the levels of the Category 2 chemicals remaining in the container (approximately 5%), the viscous nature of the remnants, and the limited ability to recover any useable material, the Secretariat is in a position to affirm that the material no longer presents a proliferation threat.

10. The Secretariat has been approached with offers to the trust fund for the decontamination of the decanted tanks and the clean-up of the containers remaining in Ruwagha. The hydrolysis of the contents of the remaining tank is anticipated to be accomplished during the clean-up operations.

Overall costs and status of the trust fund

11. On 1 August 2016, the Secretariat issued a Note calling for voluntary contributions for support to Libya (S/1400/2016, dated 1 August 2016). As at 31 October 2016, the trust fund contained a balance of EUR 848,090, with contributions having been received from Canada, Finland, New Zealand and the United States of America. To date, over EUR 386,354 has been disbursed from the trust fund for activities related to the destruction of Libya's Category 2 chemical weapons. An additional EUR 44,000, contributed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, was spent on removal operations. It is anticipated that invoices will be received shortly for verification activities that have taken place in Germany. The Secretariat is in the process of preparing a budget for the work related to the clean-up at Ruwagha. The European Union has expressed an interest in contributing to this effort. The Director General would once again like to express his appreciation to those States Parties that have already made or have committed to make voluntary contributions to the trust fund.

United Nations S/2016/1015

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 December 2016
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

For some six years, armed terrorist groups have been committing crimes against humanity, targeting defenceless civilians in various Syrian cities. The groups, including Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Nusrah Front, the Army of Conquest, Ahrar al-Sham, the Nur al-Din al-Zanki movement and the Army of Islam, have foreign backing. Their terrorist crimes could not have continued without the overt or covert support of Members of the Security Council, or without the generous supplies of funds, weapons and ammunition, not to mention political and media cover, that are provided by certain States such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, that are well known to everyone.

The armed terrorist groups have systematically targeted public property, facilities, infrastructure and economic institutions, particularly teaching institutions. In that connection, I should like to transmit a detailed report of damage sustained by the Ministry of Education of the Syrian Arab Republic up until 30 October 2016. Several schools, education complexes and administrative buildings were partially or wholly destroyed. The report also sets out the cost of repairing the damage, and the numbers of teachers and pupils killed in all Syrian governorates.

The international community's failure to condemn these crimes has encouraged the armed terrorist groups to continue killing innocent people and destroying cultural assets in Syria.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that it will continue to fight and suppress terrorism. It is determined comprehensively to fulfil its constitutional and legal duties by protecting its people, its land and its sovereignty. It calls on the Security Council and the Secretary-General to condemn these acts of terrorism and assume their responsibility by combating and eradicating terrorism, tackling its roots and sources of funding, and prosecuting its sponsors, in accordance with Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, particularly resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014) and 2199 (2015). The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic will take legal action against those States that support armed terrorist groups, and will hold them responsible for their actions sooner or later.

Please recycle

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the identical letters dated 1 December 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Damage to the education sector

The total damage done to the education sector now stands at more than 305,247,494,000 Syrian pounds, as follows:

1. Direct damage

- A total of 444 schools have been damaged. The cost of rebuilding them is estimated at some 66,600,000,000 Syrian pounds.
- A total of 811 schools have been partially damaged. The cost of repairing them is estimated at some 12,165,000,000 Syrian pounds.
- A total of 9,433 schools are in need of repairs, at an estimated cost of 141,495,000,000 Syrian pounds.
- A total of 216 education complexes and administrative buildings have been damaged. The cost of repairing them has been estimated at 4,330,330,000 Syrian pounds.
- A total of 48,577,164,000 Syrian pounds' worth of equipment, machinery and materials used in the education process has been stolen or vandalized.

2. Indirect damage

Pupils at all levels have lost an opportunity for an education, and the lost classes will have to be taught again at an estimated cost of 32,080,600,000 Syrian pounds.

3. Human damage

A total of 457 teachers and administrators and 630 male and female pupils have been killed, for a total of 1,087 dead. The figures by governorate are given below.

Governorate	*Pupils killed*	*Teachers and administrators killed*
Damascus	33	24
Rif Dimashq	226	72
Dar'a	80	77
Qunaytirah	15	21
Suwayda'	0	9
Homs	100	25
Hama	46	25
Aleppo	35	17
Idlib	21	48

Governorate	*Pupils killed*	*Teachers and administrators killed*
Tartus	6	44
Ladhiqiyah	21	14
Hasakah	8	11
Dayr al-Zawr	24	28
Raqqah	15	16
Central administration	0	26
Total	**630**	**457**
		1 087

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Agenda item 51
Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept note entitled "Partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations: strengthening the role of regional actors in conducting peace operations", which was drafted for the meeting of the United Nations Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations that I chaired on 27 May 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Fodé **Seck**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note on the theme "Partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations: strengthening the role of regional actors in conducting peace operations" for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

[Original: English]

On 27 May 2016, Senegal, as Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, will hold a thematic discussion entitled ""Partnerships: strengthening the role of regional actors in conducting peace operations."

This discussion will bring together Security Council members and a broad range of Member States, particularly troop - and police-contributing countries. Mr. El-Ghassim WANE, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and Dr Donald Kaberuka, High Representative of African Union for the AU Peace Funds, Ambassador Macharia KAMAU, and Ambassador Loannis Vrailas Deputy Permanent Representative of the European Union delegation to the United Nations have been invited to brief the Working Group.

BACKGROUND

The United Nations are no longer the only actor in the field of the maintenance of peace and security. They share more responsibility for peacekeeping and security with regional Organizations. Indeed Regional and sub regional organizations are playing an important role in the collective peace and security architecture.

They are taking over greater responsibilities and are becoming more prominent features in the global peace and security landscape with the increase in number of peace operations led by regional actors.

This evolution stems from the awareness that regional actors offer comparative advantages by bringing a better understanding of context, local implications, roots causes and driving forces of a conflict.

The particular interest of regional organizations in maintaining peace in their regions and their greater knowledge of the regional context lend more legitimacy and sensitivity to their interventions.

Moreover, they may be in a better position to react preventively by deploying troops more promptly and are often more willing to respond in complex security contexts.

In this context of the shifting nature of conflicts dynamic and the rapid evolving of unconventional threats to international peace and security, the demand for peacekeeping is growing and the strengthening of the partnerships with regional organizations, in accordance with chapter VIII of the Charter, appears to be an effective way to improve the collective response to these complex challenges. In this

regard, the UN-AU relationship is the foremost example of the implementation of the Chapter VIII provisions of the UN Charter.

In its presidential statement S/PRST/2014/27 ", the Security Council acknowledged the progress made in the ongoing cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, and stressed the importance of further strengthening cooperation and developing effective partnership with the African Union Peace and Security Council consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, to address common collective security challenges in Africa.

The need to enhance cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations, in particular the African Union has been one of the core recommendations of ongoing review processes meant to make UN peace operations more effective. While the African Union has assumed more responsibilities in peace and security on the continent, it is nevertheless, is facing major challenges to reach its potential in this regard.

Therefore, there is a need to enhance the existing partnership between the UN and the AU, at both the strategic and operational levels, in order to ensure greater synergies and coherence and more effective response to evolving peace and security chalienges facing the African continent.

The High level panel on UN peacekeeping operations stresses the need to mobilize comparative advantages of the United Nations and regional organizations in responding to emerging crises and calls for a bold new agenda to build a strong global-regional framework to meet those challenges through responsible and principled strategic partnerships.

The panel further stresses the importance for the Security Council to be able to rely upon a more resilient framework for swift and effective international response in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Recognizing that African Union and its sub regional partners, in particular, have become increasingly operational, the panel recommends also the intensification of the regional partnerships of the United Nations in Africa whether in preventing conflict or responding to it and invites the United Nations to take the decisive step to invest in and commit to the success of the African Union as a partner in addressing shared concerns. The panel further recommends more support to African Union peacekeeping operations approved by the Security Council and calls for more predictable funding, including the use of contributions of States.

The panel's call for enhancing the cooperation with the African Union is echoed by the Secretary General implementation's report S/2015/682 where he recognizes that the international peace and security responsibilities shouldered by the African Union and regional economic communities and regional mechanisms in Africa have grown enormously in recent years and they represent a significant human and financial

burden for African countries. He stresses also the need to look for ways to share that burden and commits himself to strengthening arrangements that enable effective delivery by the African Union for the collective benefit and, where United Nations peace operations deploy alongside or after African Union missions, to reinforcing the political and operational benefits of cooperation. The Secretary General concurred with the Panel's call for sustained, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms to support African Union peace support operations.

SCOPE AND PERSPECTIVES

As underlined in the Secretary general's report "Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping" Since the entry into force of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in December 2003 the African Union and the regional economic communities/ regional mechanisms have been increasingly taking initiatives on peace and security, and their role in those areas has grown, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The partnership between the United Nations and the African Union has greatly evolved in 2007 with the establishment of annual joint consultative meetings between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Both organs have underlined their commitment to the development of a stronger and more structured relationship, through enhanced information-sharing, synergies in planning and monitoring, joint assessments and strategies to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

In 2010 the UN and AU created the Joint Task Force (JTF) on peace and security. In 2010, a major step forward was taken with the creation of the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) by General Assembly resolution A/64/288 which endorsed the proposal contained in the Secretary General's report A/64/762. It was mandated to enhance the strategic and operational partnership between the two organizations in the area of peace and security, provide coordinated and coherent United Nations support to the African Union on both short-term operational and planning matters and long-term capacity-building, and provide a more coherent, cost-effective and efficient United Nations representation to the African Union. The Secretary General appointed an UN special representative to the AU at the level of under-secretary-general.

Several recommendations and measures were announced by the UN Secretary-General to strengthen the partnership with the African Union and in particular of African capacities in the area of peacekeeping:

1 - the completion in 2016 of the UN-African Union joint framework for a stronger partnership for peace and security, which will provide a blueprint for the two organizations to act quickly and without interruption before, during and after conflicts and supporting research for political solutions to crises;

2- the support of the SG / UN recommendation by the independent High Level Group on Peace Operations for the establishment of mechanisms to provide a stable, predictable and flexible to Peace Support Operations AU. A joint evaluation of the financing mechanisms and support of the AU will soon be undertaken;

3- Institutionalization of frameworks for dialogue and cooperation between the AU and the United Nations (consultative processes and joint mechanisms);
4- Creation of two regional offices, one in North Africa and one in Southern Africa;
5- Contribution to the UN in the pre-deployment training;
6- Definition of a common vision of the transitioning benchmarks that will guide transfer to the United Nations management of AU operations, lessons-learned exercises from experiences gained in Mali (MINUSMA), CAR (MINUSCA) and Somalia (AMISOM)
8- The idea of the SG / UN to explore with the AU and the EU, the option to use once it is fully operational, the African Standby Force, to serve as a transition force pending the mobilization and deployment of a UN mission.

In the field of peacekeeping, several models of partnerships have been developed between the UN and the AU. Since 2002, planned transitions from African Union to UN peace operations have taken place in Burundi, Mali and Central African Republic. The African Union Mission in Sudan transitioned into the hybrid AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2008. In 2009 was established the UN's support Office to the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA).

CHALLENGES

Challenges are numerous but the major and critical obstacle in this area is the lack of flexible, sustainable and predictable funding, as well as oversight and accountability mechanisms.

In the S/PRST/2014/27 "The Security Council recognizes that one major constraint facing the African Union, in effectively carrying out the mandates of maintaining regional peace and security is securing predictable, sustainable and flexible resources.
This issue is considered so important that in 2008, it prompted the Secretary-General to establish an African Union-United Nations panel in charge of considering the modalities of how to support — including financially — African Union peace operations established under a United Nations mandate. The Security Council has been seized of this issue on several occasions since then. How the African Union-led peacekeeping initiatives are financed According to the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002), member States of the African organization deploying personnel in African Union peace operations bear the cost of their participation during the first three months and the organization commits to reimburse those States within a period of six months, then proceeding to finance the operation. The African Union established a Peace Fund to provide the necessary financial resources for its peace operations: such a fund is made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the African Union, voluntary contributions from member States and other sources within Africa (private sector, civil society and individuals), and through appropriate fundraising activities.

However, for a number of reasons, some of them political, never before January 2013 with the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali

(AFISMA) was the African Union in a position to make available some of its own funds for a peace operation. Indeed, the African Union has been almost entirely dependent on exceptional measures and on external sources of funding for its peacekeeping initiatives. Apart from its own Peace Fund, the African Union currently depends on four different sources of money to deploy peace operations: the African Peace Facility, financed through the European Development Fund; multi-donor trust funds; bilateral financial support to troop- and police-contributing countries; and United Nations assessed contributions. As an example, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is financed by bilateral donations and voluntary contributions either to a United Nations managed Trust Fund or to troop- and police-contributing countries directly. Moreover, the European Union provides the resources for the payment of troop allowances and other related expenses, within the framework of the African Peace Facility. However, E.U has decided to reduce, by 20 per cent of its funding to AMISOM troop allowances. Lastly, AMISOM benefits from a United Nations logistical support package dispensed through the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA).

The lack of flexible, sustainable and predictable funding engenders acute problems that prevent the African Union from playing the role it should have in the field of peacekeeping.

So as it is clearly underlined in the Common African position on the review of peace operations, the financing of African-led peace operations in a flexible, predictable and sustainable manner remains one of the most important strategic challenges facing the AU and UN, and more needs to be done to address this challenge directly. African peace operations represent local responses to global problems and effective African peace operations thus represent a significant contribution to the global common good. Moreover, Africa has become the largest single contributor to UN peace operations, contributing approximately 45 % of the UN's uniformed peacekeepers.

To date, there are three ways in which the UN has supported AU operations in the past: through undertaking hybrid missions where the AU retains a political role in the management of the mission, but where the financial costs are fully funded by the UN through the normal process of assessed contributions (e.g. UNAMID); through deploying a UN support mission to indirectly support key elements, including logistics, of an AU mission (e.g. UNSOA), and by the UNSC authorizing a UN Trust Fund that is dependent on voluntary contributions but that has the political backing of the UNSC. The AU- UN joint review was expected to be launched this month this process should lead to recommendations regarding how the financing mechanisms can be improved and adapted in the future

The AU is committed to increase the proportion of the cost of AU peace operations covered by the AU and its Member States.

The recent appointment of an African Union High level representative of the African Union Peace Fund is a strong signal to the International community on the union's commitment towards finding sustainable, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms to support AU-led peace operations. In addition, the African Union aims at financing 25 per cent of its peace support operations expenditures by 2020 through its own budget and also to seek alternative ways to finance the AU and its peace operations.

OBJECTIVE

In the light of ongoing process in assessing the mechanisms of financing and supporting African union peace operations, and considering the ongoing efforts from the AU, this thematic discussion gives and opportunities to take of stock ongoing efforts and initiatives to assess current funding practices and mechanisms of AU-led peace operations with a view to stirring debate on the question of financing of peace missions in Africa.

Key questions for considerations:

What models of predictable mechanisms can be developed for addressing the financing of AU peace operations in future?

What experience could be drawn from the mechanism of Trust Funds in terms of reliability, predictability and accessibility?

What is the appropriate consultative decision-making framework, division of labor and burden-sharing that should be put in place, and how would this impact on peace operations, as undertaken by both the UN and the AU?

- How relations between the United Nations and the African Union in the area of peace and security could be better viewed as a strategic partnership, based on a division of labor and burden sharing?

- How can the UN better support the AU-led missions that are authorized by the UNSC?